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PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON DEMONSTRATIONS 
Vince Blasi* 
[W]isdom cries out in the streets, and no man regards it. 
-William Shak.espeare1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As recently as seven years ago, the Supreme Court could charac-terize a mass demonstration of 187 blacks at a Southern state 
capitol as "an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in their 
most pristine and classic form.''2 In retrospect, the choice of the 
adjective "pristine" to describe the phenomenon of mass protest 
seems to have been itself pristine, if not naive. The remark is in-
structive, however, in that it reveals how the current constitutional 
doctrine governing mass demonstrations was formulated in a quite 
different protest era, guided in large part by an almost idyllic 
imagery: the polite, if persistent, Jehovah's Witness; the stoic, dis-
ciplined (and well-financed) Freedom Marchers; the unsophisti-
cated, highly visible Southern police bully. With the spotlight 
shifted to the Weathermen and the Hard-Hats, the Vietnam Mora-
torium and the Chicago Parks Department, it may be that the in-
herited constitutional doctrines are no longer adequate. 
Some of those doctrines have to do with the special problem 
of prior restraints-most significantly, permit requirements and 
injunctions. Presently, these regulatory devices are subject to only 
the most amorphous of constitutional controls. Although the Su-
preme Court has favored street protestors with volumes of rhetoric 
and numerous after-the-fact legal victories, it has contributed vir-
tually nothing in the way of concrete standards and procedures 
that have any impact when constitutional protection is most needed 
-before and during the demonstration. With regard to substantive 
standards, the Court has failed to recognize some of the more 
difficult issues, has written unintelligibly on others, and, in the one 
important area where it has formulated doctrine carefully, has 
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versity; J.D. 1967, University of Chicago.-Ed. 
I would like to express my appreciation for the special assistance given me in the 
preparation of this article by four good friends: Professors Paul Brest and Richard 
Markovits of Stanford Law School, Professor George Schatzki of The University of 
Texas Law School, and Mr. Edward Mallett of the Texas Bar. 
1. THE FIRST PART OF THE HISTORY OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH, act 1, sc. 2, ll. 
73-74 (H. Richmond ed. 1967). 
2. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). 
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selected a standard that gives local officials virtually unlimited 
authority.3 In the procedural realm, the Court has hinted in dic-
tum that prior restraints on demonstrations will be measured against 
the developing standards of "first amendment due process,"4 but 
no significant breakthrough, much less a comprehensive approach, 
has yet materialized. 
The starting point for the analysis that follows is the belief 
that new constitutional doctrine-both substantive and procedural 
-is urgently needed. That conclusion rests on two critical assump-
tions-assumptions which may not be shared by others who read 
history differently,5 or who have had different personal experiences 
regarding prior restraints on demonstrations, or who have different 
behavioral impressions based on observation and conversation, or 
best of all, who have quantitative data on the problem. 
The first assumption is that the mass protest demonstration is, 
and should be, a full-fledged member of the first amendment pan-
theon. It is true that the Court has classified mass demonstrations as 
"speech plus,"6 but that categorization, if it has any utility at all,7 
relates to the need for a different first amendment standard based 
on the presence of unusually tangible and serious countervailing 
regulatory interests which may not be adequately protected by a test 
such as "clear and present danger"; "speech plus" does not suggest 
that the speech component is any less important, or that the constitu-
tional presence should be any less commanding. 
There are many reasons why demonstrations should qualify for 
unadulterated first amendment protection. One is the specific word-
ing of the constitutional text: "the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." 
Another is the fact that political persuasion in the second half of the 
twentieth century is closely related to media exposure; demonstra-
tions, rightly or ·wrongly, attract the television cameras and result in 
the airing of slogans-if not cogent critiques-that would not other-
wise penetrate into the inner reaches of Middle America. It might 
3. See text accompanying notes 17-33 infra. 
4. See text accompanying notes 200-06 infra. 
5. See generally E. HoBSBAWM, PruMmVE REBELS (1965); G. RUDE, THE CROWD IN 
HISTORY (1964); THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, A REPORT SUBMI'ITED TO THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE (H. Graham 8: T. 
Gurr ed. 1969). See also G. LEBON, THE CROWD (2d ed. 1968); N. SMELSER, THEORY OF 
COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR (1963). 
6. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). 
7. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. 
R.Ev. 1, 25. 
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also be suggested that mass gatherings provide some index of the 
breadth and depth of sentiment on a particular issue, information 
that can be useful to the guardians of the old order as well as to 
proponents of change. A freedom-of-association argument can be 
fashioned, pointing to the role demonstrations play in helping the 
disparate adherents to a cause meet each other, raise funds, and 
sometimes discover an unexpected unity and momentum. To the 
extent that the first amendment is concerned with self-actualization 
-with free expression in a more psychological sense-the physical 
"step fonvard" can be an important moment, as Billy Graham, 
among others, can attest. It is no doubt true that mass demonstra-
tions can be politically counter-productive, but that would seem to 
be a determination best left to the protestors themselves. 
The second important assumption is that political and social 
pressures are especially intense during disputes over demonstrations 
-so much so that every effort should be made to have the issues 
decided according to previously established doctrines that are as 
specific and conclusive as is feasible, and also by tribunals that are 
as immune as possible from those pressures by virtue of tenure, geo-
graphic remoteness, or multimember constitution. Such virtues as 
"detachment," "objectivity," and "neutrality" can never be achieved 
in any absolute sense-and they can be pursued only at a sacrifice 
of flexibility, intuitive judgment, and "realism." The trade-off will 
not always be salutary, particularly in those problem areas, including 
demonstration regulation, for which the fact situations are unusually 
varied and the costs of unrealistic decisions unusually high. But that 
determination should not be made in the abstract or in general; an 
issue-by-issue analysis is required. 
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDs-PossIBLE REAsoNs FOR 
PROHIBITING DEMONSTRATIONS 
It used to be that municipalities could prohibit demonstrations 
on public property at whim; all that was necessary was an assertion 
of the prerogatives traditionally associated with the private owner-
ship of land. The doctrine had its genesis in a characteristic effort by 
Justice Holmes, then on the Massachusetts supreme court, to solve a 
difficult first amendment problem by simplistic resort to a common-
law concept: "For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to for-
bid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an 
infringement of rights of a member of the public than for the owner 
of a private house to forbid it in the house."8 Forty-two years later, 
8. Davis v. Massachusetts, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895), afjd., 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
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Justice Roberts responded to Holmes in kind, finding his own sim-
plistic succor in the common-law doctrines of adverse possession and 
public trust: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, 
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, com-
municating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions."0 The Roberts approach has prevailed, so much so that the 
Supreme Court recently held that even privately owned shopping 
centers must show a good deal more than "naked title" in order to 
prohibit protest activities.10 
Beyond the rhetoric and the generalities and the superficial 
private-law analogies which have dominated judicial discussion of 
the problem of demonstrations on public land, there lie some extraor-
dinarily difficult value conflicts-conflicts that the courts have barely 
begun to face up to in any meaningful way. For purposes of analysis, 
the issues may be defined in terms of the possible reasons a munici-
pality may have for refusing to allow a proposed demonstration. At 
least eight such reasons can be imagined: (1) competing public uses; 
(2) the message of the demonstration; (3) the purpose of the demon-
stration; (4) the fear of a hostile audience; (5) the past conduct of the 
applicants; (6) an immediate background of violence; (7) failure by 
the demonstrators to make a timely application for a permit; and 
(8) the applicants' refusal or inability to pay the costs associated with 
the demonstration. 
A. Competing Public Uses 
A decision to grant a demonstration permit is a decision to 
allocate to the applicants' use a number of limited public resources. 
While the streets and parks may "belong to the people," as the slogan 
has it, the people usually want to use those streets and parks for 
purposes other than demonstrating-driving, parking, strolling, 
shopping, playing, gossiping, relaxing, contemplating. The people, 
moreover, generally prefer to deploy their policemen in crime-ridden 
neighborhoods rather than on parade routes or at rally sites. The 
individual and societal interest in expression, including mass demon-
strative expression, and the danger of bias against unpopular ele-
ments of the community, make the problem of prior restraints on 
demonstrations one of constitutional dimension; but that should not 
obscure the fact that the problem is primarily a question of resource 
allocation among competing, legitimate interests rather than a matter 
9. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
IO. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 324 (1968). 
1486 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:1481 
of irreducible, fundamental rights. Even absolutists must retreat in 
the face of Harry Kalven's "unbeatable proposition that you cannot 
have two parades on the same corner at the same time."11 
When one recognizes, as has the Supreme Court,12 that the proper 
rubric is resource allocation, the constitutional issue turns out to be 
one of specificity and proof: how must the competing public uses 
be characterized and quantified before the courts will be satisfied that 
the free speech interest has been given its due? Although the Court 
has invalidated many permit systems dealing with handbills,13 solici-
tations,14 soundtrucks,15 and mass gatherings,16 virtually all of those 
regulatory schemes failed utterly to articulate any standards for 
ruling upon the permit applications. Only two Supreme Court deci-
sions have dealt with demonstration permit systems that attempted 
to establish issuance criteria in terms of competing public uses, and 
in both cases the question was the validity of the permit scheme on 
its face, and not the propriety of a specific injunction or permit 
denial. 
In Cox v. New Hampshire11 the Supreme Court upheld a statute 
which, as interpreted by the New Hampshire supreme court, re-
quired the issuance of a permit "if after a required investigation it 
was found that the convenience of the public in the use of the 
streets would not thereby be unduly disturbed, upon such conditions 
or changes in time, 'place and manner as would avoid disturbance."18 
The Court's holding has two important features. First, at least in 
order to be held valid on its face, the scheme need require no finding 
more specific or concrete than "undue" disturbance of public "con-
venience." Second, the city can insist on "conditions or changes" with 
respect to time, place, and manner of the demonstration if such 
changes would "avoid disturbance," presumably even if the time, 
place, and manner preferred by the applicants would not create an 
undue disturbance. 
11. Kalven, supra note 7, at 25. 
12. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965). 
13. See, e.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 
308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
14. See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 
418 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940). 
15. See, e.g., Soia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). 
16. See, e.g., Niemetko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 
(1939). 
17. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
18. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 146, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940), quoted at 312 U.S. at 576, 
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At issue in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham19 was the follow-
ing standard: "The commission shall grant a written permit for such 
parade, procession or other public demonstration, prescribing the 
streets or other public ways which may be used therefor, unless in its 
judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good 
order, morals or convenience require that it be refused."20 While 
acknowledging the special regulatory problems presented by mass 
gatherings, the Court nonetheless found the handbill cases21 control-
ling for the constitutional requirement of "narrow, objective, and 
definite standards to guide the licensing authority,"22 and held that 
the Birmingham ordinance did not measure up to that requirement: 
"[E]ven when the use of its public streets and sidewalks is involved 
.•. a municipality may not empower its licensing officials to roam 
essentially at will, dispensing or withholding permission to speak, 
assemble, picket or parade according to their own opinions regarding 
the potential effect of the activity in question on the 'welfare,' 'de-
cency,' or 'morals' of the community."23 Lest it be thought, however, 
that lack of specificity was the defect, it should be noted that the 
Court withheld condemnation of the other criteria in the Birming-
ham ordinance-"peace," "health," "good order," "convenience"-
and also that the opinion described the disapproved criteria as "en-
tirely unrelated to legitimate municipal regulation of the public 
streets and sidewalks."24 Another pregnant omission was the Court's 
failure to say anything about the provision giving the licensing of-
ficials apparently plenary power to prescribe "the streets or other 
public ways which may be used therefor."25 
Probably the most significant part of the Shuttlesworth opinion, 
however, is its dictum. The Alabama supreme court had attempted 
to save the Birmingham ordinance by means of a "remarkable job of 
plastic surgery,"26 incorporating word-for-word the standard ap-
proved in Cox v. New Hampshire-"the convenience of the public 
in the use of the streets or sidewalks would not thereby be unduly 
disturbed."27 The Supreme Court refused to recognize this gloss of 
19. ll94 U.S. 147 (1969). 
20. BIRMINGHAM, ALA., CODE § 1159 (1944), quoted at 394 U.S. at 149-50. 
21. See note Ill supra. 
22, 394 U.S. at 151. 
2ll. 394 U.S. at 153. 
24. 394 U.S. at 153. 
25. BIRMINGHAM, ALA., CODE § 1159 (1944), quoted at 394 U.S. at 149. 
26. 394 U.S. at 15ll. 
27. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 281 Ala. 542, 546, 206 S.2d 348, ll52 
(1967), quoted at 394 U.S. at 154. 
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the Alabama court for a number of contorted reasons,28 but did 
gratuitously "assume ... that the ordinance as now authoritatively 
construed would pass constitutional muster,"29 subject to the admoni-
tion that "[t]he validity of this assumption would depend upon, 
among other things, the availability of expeditious judicial review of 
the Commission's refusal of a permit."30 The cryptic phrase "other 
things" almost certainly must refer to other procedural safeguards 
such as the right to an administrative hearing,31 to the absence of 
additional criteria unrelated to competing public uses such as the 
content of the message and past conduct of the applicants,32 or to 
the absence of a history of administrative abuse. The most plausible 
reading of Shuttlesworth, therefore, is that the competing public 
uses sufficient to justify refusal of a permit for a mass demonstration 
need be characterized in terms no more specific than "convenience" 
and quantified in terms no more precise than "undue disturbance." 
In practical terms, the combined import of Cox and Shuttlesworth 
is to give the ultimate decision-maker virtually unfettered discretion 
in deciding the issue of resource allocation. This approach does not 
necessarily run afoul of the strong principle against unlimited ad-
ministrative discretion when free speech is involved,33 for the ulti-
mate decision-maker can be the local court, an appellate court, or 
even the United States Supreme Court, depending on the correlative 
constitutional doctrines concerning expeditious judicial review34 and 
self-help.35 Although it can be argued that in this politically charged 
area discretionary power that could never be entrusted to city of-
ficials may properly be given to the courts, the dangers inherent in 
judicial discretion-potential for abuse, diminished constitutional 
legitimacy36-make principled, doctrinal judicial review a preferable 
28. The primary reasons that the Court refused to recognize this gloss were because 
it came too late-after the events that gave rise to the prosecution, the trial, and the 
charge to the jury-and because the Birmingham officialdom-in the person of Bull 
Connor-had acted upon a quite different reading of the statute. On this problem of 
judicial rewriting of overbroad statutes see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth 
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 891-901 (1970); Comment, Judicial Rewritings of Over-
broad Statutes: Protecting the Freedom of Association from Scales to Robel, 57 CALIF. 
L. REv. 240 (1969). 
29. 394 U.S. at 155. 
30. 394 U.S. at 155 n.4. 
31. See text accompanying notes 273-82 infra. 
32. See pt. II. B. infra (message) and pt. II. E. infra (past conduct). 
33. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965). 
34. See text accompanying notes 252-62 infra. 
35. See pt. III. E. infra. 
36. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); C. BLACK, JR., 
THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? A Comment 
on the Two-Level Theory of Decision, 74 YALE L.J. 640 (1965). 
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solution. Certainly the variables are too nµmerous and the judgments 
are too subtle to make feasible-at any level of decision-making-any 
kind of "definitional" or "per se" methodology. It is possible, how-
ever, that legal methods intermediate in the spectrum between abso-
lute discretion and per se rules-balancing a finite number of 
previously legitimated factors; enforcement of an equal protection 
standard; and evaluation of reasonable alternatives-can provide a 
better means of dealing with the problem than the Court's present 
essentially discretionary approach. 
I. Controlled Balancing 
While discretionary decision-making calls for a balancing of all 
relevant considerations, "balancing" as a methodological term of 
art refers to a more controlled, artificial, inflexible, fragmented, less 
easily abused process whereby the decision concerning which factors 
will be cognizable and how they shall be weighted is made before-
hand, without reference to a specific factual dispute.37 For example, 
37. All legal reasoning is "balancing" in the sense that value conflicts can be intel-
ligently resolved only by adding up the pros and the cons of the competing positions. 
The important methodological question concerns the level of generality at which the 
value resolution should take place. Thus, an absolutist can argue that "on balance," 
considering not only the value of speech and the conflicting governmental interest in 
regulation, but also such factors as judicial economy and legitimacy, it is best never to 
allow punishment for "speech" but to pose few constitutional barriers to punishment 
for "conduct." Even then, the absolutist must define "speech" and "conduct," which 
he may do, for example, by deciding that, "on balance," it is best always to consider 
black armbands "speech" and face-to-face epithets "conduct." Others may favor a lower 
level of generality. They may argue that the value of speech, the conflicting govern-
mental interest, the adjudication cost, the enforcement feasibility, the chilling effect, 
and other elements vary so much that a value resolution at the abstract level of "speech" 
and "conduct" is too unresponsive to the underlying competing values to be desirable. 
They may suggest a different per se formula for each general area of speech contro-
versy: for example, obscenity ("appeals to the prurient interest, patently offensive, 
utterly without redeeming social value''); libel ("with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not''); subversive membership (''know-
ing, active membership, with specific intent to forward unlawful goals''); advocacy 
("directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action''). Still others may suggest that even these specially tailored tests 
are too abstract and unresponsive, and that a better approach is to weigh and resolve 
the conflicting values in each case. At the lowest level of generality, this process calls 
for the decision-maker to engage in a pristine utilitarian calculus for each fact situation 
-in short, to exercise discretion. A level of generality somewhat higher than discretion 
but lower than the per se tests can be achieved by limiting the number of admissible 
variables on the ground that whatever would be gained in responsiveness to underlying 
values by considering other relevant variables would be lost in complexity, cost, time-
consumption, and potential for abuse. Similarly, the admissible variables-at this point 
only general concepts-may be assigned static weights if it is thought that a case-by-
case valuation process would be too complicated or too heavily influenced by personal 
factors. This latter methodology of limited variables and fixed weights is what is meant 
herein by the term "balancing." See generally Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967); Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the 
Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARv. L. REv. 755 (1963); Note, Civil Disabilities 
and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842 (1969). 
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using a balancing approach, a city official ruling on a permit request 
would not need to take evidence on every conceivable dislocation and 
annoyance and indirect economic effect of a demonstration, and then 
try to weigh them against his assessment of the particular speech 
value of the demonstration both to participants and to recipients of 
the message. Instead, pursuant to an appellate court ruling, he might 
assign a fixed speech value to all demonstrations and then consider 
on the other side of the balance only a limited number of quantifi-
able variables such as traffic flow, parking, access to buildings, and 
pedestrian passage. A significant advantage of such a controlled-
balancing approach is economy, both in terms of the limited proof 
that must be marshalled and of the circumscribed analysis that must 
be undertaken by the decision-maker; and to the extent that expe-
dited judicial review is deemed important,38 economy should be a 
paramount consideration. Balancing also makes the initial decision 
more focused and articulated, and thus makes it more easily review-
able on appeal, an important consideration if hostility, myopia, or 
mediocrity are problems at the level of initial decision-making. Since 
the need for effective appellate review is especially great in the case 
of permit denials,39 these advantages of economy and visibility would 
seem to outw-eigh the chief drawbacks of balancing-the rigidity and 
artificiality of the process. 
But is it possible, within an acceptable range of artificiality, to 
reduce the factors involved in the terribly complex resource alloca-
tion decision to a few variables? And is it possible to develop a com-
mon unit of measurement for weighing the value of speech against 
the value of competing public uses? It would seem to be a fool's 
errand to attempt to calibrate ideas-or to assign a weight at any 
level of generality to the value of a given message. There is, however, 
a common denominator in the value conflict, and that is people. One 
man's personal satisfaction in demonstrating can be balanced against 
another man's inconvenience caused by the demonstration. In a 
constitutional system that has a strong commitment to the impor-
tance.of speech, it can safely be said that one man's interest in speech 
is at least as important as another's substantial inconvenience and 
much more important than another's minor inconvenience. 
This dichotomy benv-een substantial and minor inconvenience 
can serve to limit the number of factors in the balancing process. 
The decision-maker can ignore those who suffer only minor incon-
38. See text accompanying notes 252-62 infra, 
39. See text accompanying notes 252-72 infra. 
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venience (arguably as a trade-off for not counting the number of 
people who will be indirectly and perhaps involuntarily benefited 
by hearing the message), and then weigh the expected number of 
demonstrators against the number of people who will be substantially 
inconvenienced. Furthermore, substantial inconvenience can be re-
duced, again somewhat arbitrarily, to a finite number of forms: (1) 
serious delay in driving caused by a predictable traffic jam or lengthy 
detour; (2) loss of a parking place within three blocks of destination; 
(3) loss of access to one's destination; (4) lengthy (at least three blocks) 
pedestrian detour; (5) dramatic increase in the noise level in an area 
ordinarily distinctive for its quietude. Minor inconvenience could be 
considered in the balancing process in one exceptional circumstance: 
if the number of people likely to suffer minor physical inconvenience 
in the use of the public ways were grossly disproportionate to the 
number of demonstrators, then the speech could be prohibited. Thus, 
a solo zealot could be denied the right to commandeer even a minor 
intersection if several motorists would have to be slightly rerouted, 
and could even be denied the right to use a square or plaza should 
the number of loafers in search of serenity greatly exceed those in 
search of enlightenment. 
Critics of this balancing formula might argue that it is untrue to 
the spirit of the first amendment to define free speech according to 
the size of the protesting faction, and also that there is no reliable 
way of predicting the size of a crowd or the num~er of people who 
will be substantially inconvenienced. It undoubtedly would be irra-
tional to regulate the content of speech on the basis of numbers, since 
the worth of an idea is likely to bear little correlation to the number 
of persons who can be enlisted in its support. For the resource 
allocation aspect of speech regulation, however, the speech value at 
stake is not the survival of the idea but the personal satisfaction of 
physical participation, the sum total of which will bear at least a 
linear correlation to the size of the demonstration.40 
Prediction and proof would be difficult under the balancing for-
mula suggested above, but probably not so difficult as under the 
Supreme Court's present discretionary approach (assuming that dis-
cretion, to be defensible, must be exercised on the basis of informa-
tion and analysis rather than prejudice, whim, or inertia). Under the 
suggested controlled-balancing approach, the applicants would have 
40. Probably the correlation will be greater: the satisfaction that one person ex• 
periences from being part of a crowd of fifty is usually not as great as his satisfaction 
in being part of a crowd of several thousand; with each increment to the group there 
will be more people, each enjoying the event more. 
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to bear the burden of proving their numerical claims. Relevant evi-
dence would include membership strength, past participation in 
similar demonstrations, predictions of crowd size by reporters and 
police officers, and, most persuasively, affidavits of intent to partici-
pate. The city would have the burden of proof on the issue of 
substantial inconvenience. In most cases, traffic flow data would al-
ready be on hand; in addition, specific traffic, pedestrian, and parking 
surveys could be taken without much trouble or expense. Estimates 
of inconvenience made by city officials in granting permits to groups 
who express more "acceptable" ideas would be highly relevant. 
A final reason for preferring the controlled-balancing approach 
is that it is an ideal methodology for introducing into the decision-
making process a most significant and too frequently overlooked vari-
able: duration. A one-hour interruption of the normal routine can 
have a certain festive air; it can give the demonstrators their physical 
outlet, their showing of numerical strength, their discovery of unity, 
or their thirty seconds of television exposure. A longer event can 
wear down the patience of police and onlookers, can give hecklers 
time to round up support, and can lead to disruptive acts by protes-
tors attempting to reverse a sagging momentum. Numerical balanc-
ing would be uniquely sensitive to the duration factor because the 
number of expected demonstrators would remain constant while the 
number of people seriously inconvenienced would vary directly with 
the proposed length of the demonstration-a two-hour demonstration 
might be protected whereas a four-hour assemblage of identical size 
and character might not. 
2. Equal Protection 
Controlled balancing would also greatly facilitate enforcement 
of an equal protection standard,41 since under the balancing approach 
manageable comparisons between different demonstrations could be 
made for the first time. Presently, rejected applicants find it very 
difficult to make a persuasive equal protection claim unless a com-
parable group has previously been granted a permit for the same 
type of demonstration over the same route for the same duration at 
the same time of the day and week. The numbers game of controlled 
balancing would provide a common currency for a much broader 
range of comparisons. 
41. If an equal protection standard were desirable it could be rooted in either the 
general command of the fourteenth amendment or in the embryonic concept of "first 
amendment equal protection" suggested in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 
(1968). 
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But before stampeding on to the administrative details, it is 
necessary to consider whether the equal protection principle should 
be applicable at all to the resource allocation decision. If unpopular 
groups are protected to the extent of the controlled balance, should 
not the municipality have the option of giving some groups a larger 
share of public resources than is constitutionally required without 
thereby binding itself to similar allocations for other groups at other 
times? In this regard, the equal protection principle may actually 
conflict with the free speech interest, since a rigid most-favored-group 
guaranty might result only in fewer and smaller parades by the 
Shriners, the Little League, and the American Legion-a net loss to 
the community in terms of expression and the satisfaction of personal 
participation. 
There are few precedents on this touchy dilemma, primarily be-
cause the requisite equal protection comparison is difficult to make 
in the absence of an artificial measuring system such as the controlled 
balance. It is settled that a municipality cannot declare an area ab-
solutely off limits to one group and then allow other more popular 
groups to speak there;42 but such a situation is a separate problem 
since the all-or-nothing aspect makes the classification according to 
ideology especially debilitating, the claimed regulatory need espe-
cially unpersuasive, and the inequality especially visible. Govern-
ments can no longer distribute benefits like teaching positions,43 
civil service jobs,44 and tax exemptions45 on the basis of ideological 
affinity, but a major reason for that doctrine is the empirical assump-
tion that such a distribution scheme would have an over-all in-
hibiting effect on expression.46 This may be a doubtful assumption 
42. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemetko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 
268, 272-73 (1951). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557 (1965); Davis v. 
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 
83, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Resistance v. Commissioners of Fair-
mount Park, 298 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881, 885 
(E.D. Pa. 1968) (attempt to ban "hippies" from a public square: "the law may not 
suppress one class of idlers in order to make a place more attractive for other idlers 
of a more desirable class'); Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 
438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 
P .2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 
2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. 
Ct. 1962). 
43. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). See generally Israel, Elfbrandt 
v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 193. 
44. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
45. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
46. See Israel, note 43 supra; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Dis-
tinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Note, The Chilling 
Effect of the Constitutional Law, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 808 (1969). 
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when applied to demonstrations, both because a demonstrator is not 
likely to be deterred from expressing himself by the fear of losing 
incremental (over and above the controlled-balance) privileges and 
also because of the possibility, mentioned above,47 that a strict equal 
protection rule would be counter-productive in terms of the sum total 
of demonstrating. 
General fourteenth amendment principles may provide some di-
rection in determining whether and to what extent equal protection 
principles should be applied to demonstrations.48 The courts tend 
to exercise more "active" scrutiny over classifications when the in-
terests at stake are deemed "fundamental"49 or when the classifying 
criteria undercut values that are recognized by other constitutional 
provisions.50 Also, active scrutiny would seem to be more warranted 
when the classification is the work of nonelective officials51 and when 
such scrutiny would not bring on a caseload inconsistent with an 
intelligent allocation of scarce judicial resources.52 Active review is 
not, however, to be equated with unconstitutionality; rather it is a 
judicial insistence that the importance of the objective sought to be 
achieved by the classification be apparent and that alternative, less 
drastic measures for achieving that objective be employed if at all 
possible. 
In applying this analysis to the problem of permit administration, 
it would be straining somewhat to call the interest in incremental 
demonstrating "fundamental."53 While a classification according to 
47. See text preceding note 42 supra. 
48. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 
1065 (1969). 
49. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of 
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Harper v. Virginia 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right of the criminally accused to a proper de-
fense). 
50. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Brown v. Board 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial discrimination). 
51. When a court reviews a classification made by nonelective officials, the (largely 
specious) arguments about deference to legislative judgment, effective remedies at the 
ballot box, and the need to allow flexibility for legislative compromising and logrolling, 
have no applicability. 
52. This may explain the Supreme Court's seeming reluctance to do anything about 
the gross inequality inherent in most educational financing schemes. See Mcinnis v. 
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); J. COONS, w. CLUNE &: w. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH 
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970). 
53. This is not to disparage the importance of demonstrating nor to imply that the 
interest in demonstrating that goes into the controlled balance is not entitled to great 
weight. The point is simply that the interest in getting more than the controlled bal-
ance would allocate cannot compare to the interests at stake in the voting and criminal 
defense cases. Language in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), suggests that all 
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ideology would certainly seem to undercut first amendment values, 
a classification according to a reasonable apprehension of violence 
might not. The fact that the permit decision is usually made by non-
elective officials would seem to favor active review of the decision. 
While a strict equal protection standard would not lead to the initia-
tion of many new cases, it would, nevertheless, severely complicate 
existing litigation. Factual disputes would rage, not only over the 
immediate planned event, but also over the proper estimates for past 
uncontested demonstrations. This problem of proof could be mini-
mized by accepting the city's recorded estimates of participation and 
inconvenience for all permits voluntarily granted, but such a doc-
trine might require the city to keep records against its will and in 
any event would probably only result in inflated estimates of ex-
pected Legionnaires and correspondingly deflated estimates of the 
inconvenience created by their parades. 
There would be other complicating factors in using the equal 
protection analysis. If 100 Little Leaguers were allowed seriously to 
inconvenience 200 people, would that necessarily compel the conclu-
sion that 500 Weathermen must be allowed to inconvenience 1,000 
people? Shouldn't happy New Yorkers lining the parade route to 
watch the Mets or the astronauts be counted as participants rather 
than spectators? If so, should apathetic New Yorkers watching Hubert 
Humphrey or disgruntled New Yorkers watching the Vietnam Mora-
torium be accounted for in a similar fashion? Moreover, suppose that 
the city decides that the last Shriners' parade was too bothersome and 
that it wants to reverse its resource-allocation policy? These problems 
are not insoluble, but they do introduce into the analysis an element 
of complexity that ought to weigh in the basic decision whether equal 
protection should be applicable at all, and if so, to what extent. 
The conclusion seems warranted that, in light of the problems 
outlined above, any equal protection scrutiny should be of the pas-
sive, "roll-over-and-play-dead" variety currently employed in testing 
economic regulations. is4 The applicants' interest in obtaining a re-
first amendment interests will be deemed "fundamental" for purposes of triggering 
active equal protection scrutiny. It appears, however, that "fundamentality" is to be 
determined not by looking to the general subject matter but rather to the incremental 
interest asserted, for in McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969), 
the Court exercised only passive scrutiny after explaining that although the subject 
matter was voting, the incremental interest at stake was "merely" that of obtaining an 
absentee ballot. In addition, the fundamentality concept was recently dealt a stultify-
ing blow when the Court refused to consider the interest in receiving welfare allot-
ments sufficient to trigger active equal protection review. Dandridge v. 'Williams, 397 
U.S. 471 (1970). 
54. See cases cited in notes 57-59 infra. 
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source allocation more favorable than that required by controlled 
balancing cannot be placed on a par with voting or receiving an 
effective criminal defense, and the complexities of adjudication in-
volved with a more strict standard would forbid the use of such a 
standard. 
Unequal treatment openly based on ideology may have a ring 
quite discordant with that of the first amendment, but even for such 
a blatant classification the argument for a more active scrutiny similar 
to that accorded racial classifications is less than compelling. Ideo-
logical classifications, unlike classifications based on race, sex, and 
legitimacy, are not dependent upon an immutable trait beyond the 
control of the persons affected by the discrimination. While stig-
matization of minority races can serve no legitimate governmental 
purpose, stigmatization of minority viewpoints, even to the extent of 
vice-presidential epithets, is unavoidable if the government is to have 
its day in a robust market place of ideas. Classification according to 
race, at least when it disfavors the minority race, violates what may 
be termed a moral taboo; classification according to ideology, how-
ever, is considered perfectly acceptable in many contexts-handing 
out postmasterships, inviting banquet speakers, restoring "balance" 
to an economics faculty or a supreme court. 
The thrust of this argument should not be misconstrued: the only 
point is that classification according to ideology should not be enough 
by itself to trigger active equal protection review. When the interests 
at stake are fundamental, the review should be active. When the task 
is to define the minimum amount of constitutionally protected ex-
pression, rather than to assess the significance of the city's granting 
an expression surplus to some groups, the review should be active. 
Similarly, the review should be active when the ideological classifica-
tion will have an over-all "chilling effect" on expression. But as 
detailed above,55 none of these factors is present when the issue is 
framed in terms of resource allocation beyond that required by con-
trolled balancing. 
Even under "passive" equal protection scrutiny, however, a 
classification must relate in a plausible way to some legitimate govern-
mental purpose.56 The prevention of violence would certainly qualify 
as such a purpose, and under passive review the courts would be loath 
to second-guess the city's empirical conclusion that a demonstration 
by one group presented a greater potential for violence than did a 
demonstration by another. Realistically, passive equal protection 
55. See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra. 
56. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968). 
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review would be the functional equivalent of no equal protection 
scrutiny at all, as a number of would-be barmaids,57 river pilots,58 
and opticians59 have found out. 
The conclusion that the equal protection principle should not 
limit the resource allocation decision has two important drawbacks. 
First, with an effective equal protection requirement, municipalities 
would be forced to make either honest or biased-toward-expression 
estimates for popular demonstrations, and those estimates could in 
tum serve as a credibility check against distorted estimates for un-
popular groups. With the passive equal protection standard, however, 
this check would be sacrificed. Second, legitimating ideological dis-
crimination in granting permits beyond those required to be granted 
by the controlled-balancing formula may very well have a spill-over 
effect, making bureaucrats more disposed to practice such discrimina-
tion in calculating the balance. When all is considered, however, 
these consequences are outweighed by the other more positive factors 
discussed above,60 and especially by the paramount value of mini-
mizing the complexity of adjudication in order to facilitate expedi-
tious decision-making at the highest possible level. 
3. Reasonable Alternatives 
The New Hampshire statute upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Cox, as construed by the New Hampshire supreme court, permitted 
"such conditions or changes in time, place, and manner as would 
avoid disturbance,"61 and the drastically narrowed ordinance whose 
constitutionality was assumed in Shuttlesworth gave officials the 
power of "prescribing the streets or other public ways which may be 
used therefor."62 In neither case did the Supreme Court call attention 
to the problems raised by such provisions, but the fact remains that 
the over-all schemes were approved. Thus, Cox and Shuttlesworth 
must stand as at least sub silentio declarations that alternative sites 
and times are permissible factors to be considered by officials in 
ruling upon permit requests. If this is in fact the rule for mass 
assemblies, it contrasts dramatically with the prevailing doctrine for 
handbills: "[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of ex-
57. Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
58. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
59. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
60. See text accompanying notes 42-55 supra. 
61. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 146, 16 A.2d 508, 515 (1940), quoted at 312 U.S. at 
576. 
62. BmMINGHAM, Ar.A., ConE § 1159 (1944), quoted at 394 U.S. at 149. 
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pression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be 
exercised in some other place .... "63 
A reasonable-alternative approach appears to have several advan-
tages. In terms of the controlled-balancing formula, there is nothing 
magical about a narrow outweighing of one side by the other; the 
goal should be to ma.ximize the satisfaction of personal participation 
and at the same time to minimize the inconvenience to nonpartici-
pants. Moving a demonstration to a different time or place may 
accomplish these objectives. Moreover, while it may be necessary for 
reasons of economy of adjudication to treat all serious inconveniences 
as of the same magnitude,64 the fact is that they will not be. Thus, it 
makes sense to allow the city-the party which can best judge the 
degree of inconvenience-to dictate the details of the proposed dem-
onstration in order to minimize the magnitude as well as the num-
ber of serious inconveniences. An additional dimension of the 
reasonable-alternative analysis is the planned distribution of incon-
venience. While it may not be unfair to force a particular group of 
merchants and commuters to bear the brunt of the inconvenience 
caused by one demonstration, a city cannot be blamed for attempting 
to shift the burden of inconvenience for the next demonstration to a 
different group by changing the time and/ or the place of the pro-
posed demonstration. For a host of reasons which will be discussed 
below, the fear of a hostile audience or the possibility (unsubstan-
tiated by proof of specific intent or an immediate background of 
violence) that the demonstrators will cause violence should never be 
reasons for refusing permits or enjoining assemblies.611 Consequently, 
it is all the more important for a city to minimize the danger of 
violence by rerouting the demonstrators away from hecklers and es-
pecially volatile or vulnerable areas within the city. Likewise, if ap-
plicants cannot be forced to pay in advance the cost of policing their 
event, as suggested below,66 the city has a special financial interest 
in the details of the demonstration, since the number of police re-
quired may vary considerably depending upon the time and place 
of the demonstration. In response to the cynical observation that in-
convenience, danger, and cost can always be minimized by putting 
the demonstrators out in a cow pasture, a principle could be applied 
whereby the alternative site and/or time must be, in the opinion of 
63. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). 
64. See text preceding note 40 supra. 
65. See pt. II. D. infra (fear of a hostile audience); pt. II. C. infra (specific intent); 
pt. II. E. infra (past conduct of the applicant); and pt. II. F. infra (immediate back-
ground of violence). 
66. See text accompanying notes 176-84 infra. 
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the ultimate decision-maker, just as desirable as the applicants' first 
choice. 
There are, on the other hand, two major problems with a reason-
able-alternative approach. First, it is impossible to measure the desir-
ability of a particular time and place by any standard other than the 
demonstrators' own subjective values. Can a bureaucrat or a judge 
tell the applicants that a particular site really is not all that symbolic 
or is not the true locus of their grievance? A related difficulty is that 
it smacks of paternalism to have the government dictating the details 
of a protest. Certainly a legitimate and important value to be con-
sidered in determining the desirability of a reasonable-alternative 
approach is the individual satisfaction derived, not just from par-
ticipation and expression, but from personal, creative, and unpro-
grammed participation and expression. Demonstrators, of course, 
have social obligations, but when the calculus embodied in the 
controlled-balancing formula awards them the use of public resources, 
they may justifiably chafe at having to make further sacrifices in the 
name of the public interest, especially if the utilitarian fairness of 
the controlled balance is at the same time used as a reason for not 
employing a meaningful equal protection standard in deciding the 
resource allocation question.67 
The second major problem with a reasonable-alternative ap-
proach is the omnipresent one of complexity and cost of adjudication. 
The magnitude of this problem, however, can be overestimated. A 
reasonable-alternative analysis would not complicate litigation nearly 
so much as would an active equal protection analysis since, under 
the former, the inquiry would.be limited to a few alternative sites 
and times proposed by the city, and the only question would be 
whether any of those sites and times was as desirable as the applicants' 
first choice. On the other hand, a determination of the relative 
desirability of a number of sites and times could be a substantial 
task. The variables are many: symbolic importance, comfort, likeli-
. hood of attracting media coverage, size and character of the probable 
group of bystanders, transportation and parking facilities for the 
assembling demonstrators, time convenience of the demonstrators in 
light of work, school, and child care commitments. The weighing 
process could be simplified somewhat by making conclusive the city's 
judgment that the alternative sites and times would be preferable in 
terms of the variables of public inconvenience, danger, and cost, but 
in that event the demonstrators might fairly ask why their judgment 
67. See text accompanying netes 42-60 supra. 
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concerning desirability should not likewise be conclusive for the 
variables that concern them. 
A final factor in the equation is the degree to which the advan-
tages of the reasonable-alternative approach can be realized without 
burdening the adjudication process with the complexities inherent 
in such an approach. Municipalities could be required never to reject 
applications outright, and always to offer alternative sites and times,08 
except, of course, if it could be shown that the demonstrators had a 
specific intent to cause violence.69 There would be a number of in-
centives for applicants to accept the proffered alternatives. Against 
the incremental desirability of demonstrating at the time and place 
of their first choice, demonstrators would weigh the delay, energy, 
cost, and risk of defeat involved in forcing the city into court-dis-
counted by any harassment and cause celebre advantages that litiga-
tion might offer. 
Although the factors weigh heavily on each side, and the question 
is an extremely close one, it appears that the first amendment 
controlled-balancing determination should not be affected by the 
presence or absence of alternative sites and times. Again, the decisive 
factor is complexity of adjudication. If expedited judicial review is 
to function effectively, it cannot be stressed enough how important 
it is to keep the evidence manageable and the inquiry focused. 
The factor of complexity of adjudication works to the disadvan-
tage of the applicants in one respect. While the decision-maker, at 
each level, should be required to sweeten a rejection with an offer of 
a reasonable alternative, the applicants should not be entitled to 
institute new proceedings to test the optimality of the alternative 
offering. They should be entitled to a ruling on precisely the event 
they wish to stage; if they play their hand too boldly they should have 
to settle, no questions asked, for the safe alternative offered by the 
6~. For example, a New York City Department of Parks regulation provides: 
"Whenever a permit is denied by reason of (b), (c) or (d) above [location or time not 
suitable], alternative suitable locations and dates shall be offered to the applicant." 
See Rockwell v. Morris, 12 App. Div. 2d 272, 286, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 41 (1961). In Yenof-
sky v. Silk, 305 F. Supp. 991 (D. Mass. 1969), the court listed as one of its reasons for 
granting the applicants' prayer the fact that the city had failed to offer an alternative 
route. 
69. Even a background of violence would not relieve the city from the obligation 
to offer an alternative. See pt. II. F. infra. I£ such a background were shown by proof 
of immediate past violence (see text accompanying notes 155-56 infra), the city could 
offer an alternative site where there had been no violence. If the background were 
proven by the imposition of a general curfew (see text accompanying note 157 infra), 
the city could offer a site outside the curfew area or, if the curfew were city-wide, an 
alternative time when the curfew would not be in effect; if necessary, a time as 
indefinite as "the first day after the curfew is lifted" could be offered to the ap-
plicants. 
August 1970] Prior Restraints on Demonstrations 1501 
decision-maker-while retaining, of course, the right to appeal to a 
higher tribunal the rejection of their first choice. Not only would 
this procedure limit adjudication costs, it would also give the ap-
plicants an incentive to bargain with the city over alternative times 
and routes, since they might arrive at a more desirable alternative 
through negotiation with the city than would be offered them by the 
ultimate decision-maker as a consolation prize after he rejected their 
initial proposal. 
4. Per Se Restrictions on Place, Time, Size, and Duration 
In certain situations, the use of per se rules may provide a work-
able approach for dealing with the problems presented by demonstra-
tion permit cases. In view of the undoubted importance of minimiz-
ing adjudication time and costs and of limiting the opportunity for 
administrative abuse, per se restrictions should be favored whenever 
feasible. For most demonstration permit disputes, however, the num-
ber of critical variables is so great that per se restrictions are simply 
too artificial and too unresponsive to the underlying competing 
interests. Thus, controlled balancing usually-although not always-
represents a better accommodation between realism and economy. In 
certain instances, however, per se restrictions regarding place (for 
example, never on an expressway), time (never between 4:00 p.m. 
and 7:00 p.m., Monday through Friday), duration (never longer than 
three hours) and size (never more than 1,000 marchers) may produce 
results not markedly different from the controlled balance; and these 
results could be achieved at a substantial savings in terms of the 
energy, time, and money devoted to making the decision. 
The basic question is how much deviation from the controlled-
balancing results should be tolerated in the name of economy. If 
the deviation were neutral, in the sense that it adversely affected the 
regulatory interest approximately as often as the speech interest, 
the inquiry would be reduced to weighing the artificiality of the 
process (neutral but nonetheless undesirable) against the adjudica-
tion savings. This neutrality would be possible if the regulatory 
scheme consisted entirely of per se restrictions-for example, no 
demonstrations on Sundays, on weekdays between 4:00 p.m. and 
7:00 p.m., and on Main Street, all other requests granted regardless 
of how much inconvenience would be caused thereby-but then only 
if the per se restrictions were such that the number of applications 
"improperly" (in terms of the controlled balance) granted roughly 
equalled the number of applications "improperly" denied. In prac-
tice, however, per se restrictions would always complement rather 
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than replace the balancing calculus; either would be a sufficient 
predicate for refusing to issue a permit since no municipality would 
be likely to gamble on the adequacy of a totally per se scheme. Thus, 
the deviation from the controlled-balancing results would always 
favor the regulatory interest. 
With the burden, in terms of deviation from the controlled-
balancing results, falling entirely on the speech interest, per se restric-
tions should be upheld only if that burden is kept to a relatively low 
level-that is, only if for a very high percentage of the anticipated 
(not hypothetical) requests governed by the per se restriction the 
controlled-balancing measure would likewise require rejection.70 
Probably, only per se restrictions combining the factors of place and 
time-of-day (never on Main Street between 4:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. 
on weekdays) would be able to pass this test. On the other hand, 
cities could still declare certain publicly owned properties to be 
"functionally private" and thus not open to the general public;71 
the above limitation would cover only per se restrictions with respect 
to demonstrations in "functionally public" places.72 
Per se restrictions should also be limited by an active equal 
protection standard. The reasons for not insisting on equal protection 
with respect to the balancing calculus73 are not present in the case 
of per se restrictions. Adjudication would not be complicated: did 
the city let the Shriners use Main Street or didn't it? Moreover, the 
uncertainty of how to regard the happily inconvenienced onlookers 
at a popular parade would not complicate the determination of un-
equal treatment. Furthermore, the issue is not wide-open as a matter 
70. Prophylactic regulations of speech are highly suspect. See Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 286, 379 P.2d 
481, 487, 29 Cal. Rptr. I, 7 (1963), the California supreme court found an ordinance 
which prohibited all sound trucks moving at less than IO m.p.h. to be in violation of 
the first amendment. The court stated: "Its [the ordinance's] reach is not limited to 
the prohibition of a sound truck which impedes the flow of pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic or which creates a dangerous traffic situation. Rather it sets up a blanket pro-
hibition against the use of a stationary sound truck. The provision fails because, as-
suming its valid police purpose, it proceeds beyond that which is necessary." See also 
Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Commonwealth v. Guess, 168 
Pa. Super. 22, 76 A.2d 500 (1950). 
71. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (a jailyard). 
72. See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 
(1968) (privately owned shopping center held to be "functionally public'1; In re 
Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 775, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969); Schwartz-Torrance 
Inv. Corp. v. Baker &: Confectionery Workers Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 
P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964). See also Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 
268 F. Supp. 855, 860 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd., 392 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 940 (1968); Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); In re 
Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P .2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967). 
73. See text accompanying notes 42-55 supra. 
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of precedent, since several cases have already applied an active equal 
protection standard to per se restrictions.74 
In summary, it is beyond dispute that some competing public 
uses justify permit denials for and injunctions against demonstra-
tions. The doctrinal debate is over how those uses must be character-
ized, measured, proved, and weighted. Thus far, the courts have 
failed to fashion any meaningful standards to deal with these prob-
lems; the prevailing shibboleth-"undue disturbance of public con-
venience"-amounts to no more than a gra..."lt of discretionary author-
ity to the ultimate decision-maker. 
The first amendment should be interpreted to mean that a 
demonstration must be allowed whenever the probable number of 
demonstrators exceeds the number of citizens who would be seriously 
inconvenienced by the march or rally. Minor inconvenience caused 
by the demonstration should not be considered unless the number of 
minor inconveniences is grossly disproportionate to the number of 
protestors, in which case the event could be prohibited. Should 
municipalities choose to allow some gatherings that would not qual-
ify under this numerical balancing formula, there should be no con-
stitutional requirement that less popular groups be given equal 
treatment. By the same token, demonstrations which qualify for ap-
proval under the numerical balancing standard should not be denied 
such approval on the ground that an alternative site or time would 
be less inconvenient. Finally, per se restrictions regarding place, size, 
and duration should pass constitutional muster only if, for a very 
high percentage of the anticipated requests denied because of the per 
se rule, the numerical balancing formula would likewise support 
rejection. 
B. The Message of the Demonstration 
It is easy enough to proclaim that "censorship" must not be 
practiced-that the demonstrators' ideas can never be factors in re-
fusing a permit or granting an injunction. But what if the message 
of the demonstration is obscene, libelous (even after New York 
Times Company v. Sullivan75), an invasion of privacy, or consists of 
"fighting words"?76 'What if the message is commercial and thus not 
entitled to the full panoply of first amendment protection?77 What 
74. See cases cited in note 42 supra. 
75. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
76. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
77. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
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if the demonstrators' message is a relevant factor for predicting the 
size and behavior of the crowd or the likelihood of hecklers?78 
The general problem area of prior content regulation of speech 
is, to a large extent, a doctrinal wasteland. In Near v. Minnesota10 
the Supreme Court struck down an injunction against "malicious, 
scandalous, and defamatory"80 publications and waxed eloquent on 
the general evils of prior restraints; but the opinion also emphasized 
that the particular scheme at issue placed the burden on the pub-
lisher to establish both truth and good motive. Moreover, in ac-
knowledging that the constitutional ban on prior restraints is not 
absolute, the Court proffered a far-reaching dictum: 
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual 
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing 
dates of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar 
grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced 
against obscene publications. The security of community life may be 
protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by 
force of orderly government.81 
Thirty years later, in Times Film Corporation v. City of Chi-
cago,82 the Court cited this dictum in refusing to fashion a constitu-
tional principle that would completely prohibit content regulation 
of films at the prior-restraint stage, although the opinion noted that 
motion pictures were not "necessarily subject to the precise rules 
governing any other particular method of expression."83 The Su-
preme Court has never spoken to the precise problem of prior reg-
ulation of demonstrations based on the proposed message of the 
demonstrators. The lower courts appear to be divided in this area,84 
and no lower court opinion has contributed a very helpful analysis. 
From the standpoint of efficiency, it makes sense for a city to 
regulate the content of a demonstration before the event. The dam-
78. See City of Darlington v. Stanley, 239 S.C. 139, 122 S.E.2d (1961). 
79. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
80. 283 U.S. at 706. 
81. 283 U.S. at 716. 
82. 365 U.S. 43 (1961). 
83. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952), quoted at 365 U.S. 
at 49. 
84. Compare Smith v. University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); 
Resistance v. Commissioners of Fairmount Park, 298 F. Supp. 961, 963 (E.D. Pa. 1969); 
Snyder v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927, 936 (N.D. Ill. 1968); 
Rockwell v. Morris, 12 App. Div. 2d 272, 282-83, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 36 (1961); with 
Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 
963, 973 (N.D. Miss. 1969); East Meadow Community Concerts Assn. v. Board of 
Educ., 18 N.Y.2d 129, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341, 219 N.E.2d 172 (1966). 
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age done by libelous, privacy-invading, or violence-inciting speech 
is often irreparable; preventing the speech from ever working its 
harm is better both for the putative victims and for the speakers, who 
are faced only with permit denials and injunctions rather than 
criminal convictions. A prior-restraint mechanism is also the most 
efficient means of informing demonstrators who wish to stay within 
the bounds of protected expression exactly where that elusive line is. 
A prior seal of approval may also help the demonstrators to recruit 
pillar-of-the-community types to give their event more political 
selling p·ower. In addition, permit and injunction decisions may al-
ready be influenced by expectations regarding content, so that formal 
submission of the planned speeches and signs would be an improve-
ment over a system of uninformed and paranoic guesswork by city 
officials and judges. With expedited judicial review of permit denials, 
as advocated below,85 the primary danger of prior restraints-the 
fact that professional censors are likely to reach results quite different 
from those which judges would reach-can be significantly reduced; 
moreover, this danger is not present at all when the prior restraint 
takes the form of an injunction. Thus, if the various burdens of 
initiation, going forward, and proof are placed on the government, 
again as advocated below,86 the argument against prior content reg-
ulation of demonstrations must rely essentially on the impracd.cal-
ities of enforcement. 
Prior submission of the content of a film is easy; all that is neces-
sary is to schedule an advance showing for the censors. Speeches, on 
the other hand, tend to be written the night before or, more fre-
quently, improvised on the spot from scribbled outlines. Placards 
and banners usually are produced in an uncoordinated, do-it-yourself 
fashion. Generalized descriptions of content (for example, "to protest 
the war") seldom provide enough information to support findings 
of unlawful advocacy, libel, invasion of privacy, or obscenity, al-
though in certain cases they may: for example, "will read the names 
of war dead" ;87 "will read from the private correspondence of Gray-
son Kirk";88 "will culminate with a massive draft-card turn-in";89 
"will present a nude couple making love."00 General statements of 
85. See text accompanying notes 252-62 infra. 
86. See text accompanying notes 249-51 infra (initiation); and text accompanying 
notes 226-35 infra (going forward and proof). 
87. Arguably, this would be an invasion of privacy. 
88. Id. 
89. But see Resistance v. Commissioners of Fairmount Park, 298 F. Supp. 961, 963 
(E.D. Pa. 1969). 
90. Such action clearly would be a violation of most municipal obscenity statutes. 
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content are also usually adequate to identify purely commercial ex-
hibitions. But for the most part, any consideration of content at 
the permit application stage could easily be thwarted by applicants 
careful enough to keep their demonstrations unstructured, disorgan-
ized, or spontaneous. Any attempt to coerce specificity by means of 
an obligation of full disclosure and a continuing duty to report plans 
as they progress would most likely be unenforceable, and would 
surely be a considerable annoyance both to city bureaucrats and to 
protestors. 
Thus, rather than injecting these difficult content issues into 
the permit application process and thereby putting a premium on 
vague and evasive applications, a preferable approach would be to 
develop a general constitutional ban on prohibiting a demonstration 
because of the proposed message, subject to two caveats: (I) the pro-
posed message, though not the demonstration, could be en joined; and 
(2) a proposed commercial message could support the refusal of a 
permit. 
The injunction-against-content alternative would have a number 
of virtues: the initial decision would always be made by a judge; the 
permit decision based on the permissible criteria would be separated 
from and not delayed by reversals and remands concerning the con-
tent factor; and the individuals who transgressed the bounds of pro-
tected speech could be punished for contempt without jeopardizing 
the rights of those who wished to engage in lawful assembly and 
expression. While there are maxims to the effect that "equity will 
not enjoin a crime"91 and "equity will not enjoin defamation,"92 
these doctrines are riddled with exceptions,93 are of dubious wisdom 
in the first place,94 and, in any event, are surmountable by legislation 
or judicial decree. 
On the other hand, although allowing the assembly and prohibit-
ing parts of the message might or might not increase the likelihood 
of defiance of the restrictions by the demonstrators, such a procedure 
would certainly increase the danger of harmful defiance: a crowd, 
composed in part of those who would not have come had the whole 
assembly been prohibited, would be on hand to be incited to riot or 
to resist the draft, or to hear the forbidden defamation, obscenity, 
E.g., DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE§ 39-1-26 (Supp. 1969); CHICAGO, !LL., MUNICIPAL CODE 
§ 192-7 (1963). 
91. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HAR.v. L. REv. 994, 1013-19 
(1965). 
92. Id. at 1008-12. 
93. Id. at 1013-16. 
94. Id. at 1016-18. 
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or invasion of privacy. Also, it can be argued that a nation whose 
heritage includes the Debs case95 and the other judicial outrages that 
led to the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act96 should be some-
what wary about encouraging the injunction as a method of regulat-
ing the conduct of unpopular groups, especially since there is seldom 
time for appellate review of the constitutionality of an injunction, 
and since disobedience of a court order is punished in many instances 
without the right to a jury trial.97 On the other hand, when regula-
tion speaks only to content, the facts will seldom be in dispute, so 
that the jury's role would be minimal in any event. Furthermore, 
adequate appellate review would be possible if, as advocated below,98 
protestors who made every reasonable effort to vacate an injunction 
could disobey it without losing the right to challenge its constitu-
tionality in defense to contempt citations. 
On balance, the advantages of the injunction-against-content 
method of regulation seem to outweigh the drawbacks. Except in the 
case of commercial demonstrations, the proposed message of a dem-
onstration should be individually enjoinable but should never be a 
factor in denying permit requests or in prohibiting entire assemblies 
by injunction. 
The commercial exception is desirable both in terms of first 
amendment theory and enforceability. Whether one considers the 
relevant model for free speech analysis to be the intent of the Found-
ing Fathers, the rational dialectic, access to the media, democratic 
participation, or release of the id, speech motivated by and tailored 
to the desire to sell a product would seem to fall outside the ambit 
of concern. The line is not always easy to draw, but the Supreme 
Court has ·wrestled with some of the close cases: it has held, for ex-
ample, that political advertising,99 soliciting for nonprofit causes,100 
bookselling,101 and film exhibition102 are entitled to.full first amend-
ment analysis, but that advertising of nonartistic products103 and 
soliciting for profit104 are not. Moreover, the difficulties with speci-
95. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
96. 29 u.s.c. §§ 101·15 (1964). See generally F. FRANKFURTER &: N. GREEN, THE 
WllOR INJUNCTION (1930). 
97. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969). 
98. See text accompanying notes 331-49 infra. 
99. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
100. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1940). 
101. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
102. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
103. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
104. Breard v.•City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
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ficity, spontaneity, and caprice that plague attempts to regulate con-
tent in advance would not seem to hinder the simple inquiry whether 
the message to be conveyed by the parade or assembly is, in whole or 
in part, for the purpose of advertising, promoting, or peddling a 
commercial product. 
An important question concerning content remains: can a gen-
eral statement of content be required of the applicants in order to 
aid the city in preparing for the event, even though the statement 
cannot be a factor in refusing a permit or obtaining an injunction 
against the entire demonstration? A vague, general statement of con-
tent can serve some useful functions.105 It can alert the city that the 
assemblage will be so controversial as to require extra details of po-
lice, who may be specially trained to cope with the demonstrators' 
ideological or epithetical taunts. Such a general statement can also 
give the city a basis for deciding whether an injunction against con-
tent should be sought. Citizens who are not interested in or who are 
hostile to the message can be warned ahead of time to absent them-
selves from the area to avoid becoming part of a captive audience. 
All of these functions can be served equally well, however, by re-
quiring a general statement of content after the permit is granted, 
when awareness of an unpopular message will not color more "ob-
jective" judgments relating to traffic disruption, pedestrian incon-
venience, and the like. There may be some occasions when it is in the 
interest of a notorious group to let it be known before a permit or 
injunction ruling that a particular demonstration is designed to con-
vey a relatively uncontroversial message,106 but this disclosure can be 
achieved informally without the need for a blanket obligation to re-
veal the content of the message before the decision. The constitu-
tional principle should be that, apart from the commercial exception, 
a permit can never be denied or an injunction issued simply because 
105. No court has held unconstitutional a requirement that applicants for a demon-
stration permit state their purpose or topic, although in Robinson v. Coopwood, 292 
F. Supp. 926, 932 (N.D. Miss. 1968), afjd. per curiam, 415 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1969), the 
court held that protestors cannot be compelled to disclose in advance the identity of their 
proposed speakers for a rally. Purpose and topic disclosure requirements have been 
approved, in dictum or sub silentio holding, in a number of cases. Powe v. Miles, 407 
F .2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Resistance v. Commissioners of Fairmount Park, 298 
F. Supp. 961, 963 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 973 (N.D. Miss. 
1969); Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188, 195 (M.D. Ala. 1968), af/d., 412 
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); City of Darlington v. Stanley, 239 S.C. 139, 122 S.E.2d 207 
(1961). See also American Cancer Soc. v. Dayton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 114 N.E.2d 
219 (1953), in which the court ordered the issuance of a solicitation license which 
city officials had sought to deny on the ground that the purpose of the solicitation was 
already being adequately served by previously approved solicitations by other groups. 
106. For example, a demonstration by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 
protesting pollution. 
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the protestors refuse to reveal the content of their demonstration, 
but that the permit can be revoked or the injunction granted should 
the protestors persist in their refusal after permission to hold the 
demonstration has been obtained. 
C. The Purpose of the Demonstration 
In most cases the purpose of a demonstration is inextricably 
entwined with its message. To the extent that this is true, the above 
proposals relating to disclosure of content apply as well to purpose. 
On the other hand, purpose and message are not always so closely 
related. It is no longer a rarity for permit applicants to specifically 
intend to engage in or to provoke violence regardless of their sup-
posed "message." Whatever the moral justification for such a response 
to a government that is hardly sparing in the deliberate employment 
of violence against its political opponents, foreign and domestic, no 
rational system of law can afford to condone or facilitate violent be-
havior. Thus, if it can be proved that the effective leaders of a pro-
posed demonstration have a specific intent to cause violence, whether 
directly, or indirectly by provoking the police, there should be no 
constitutional prohibition against either enjoining the assemblage or 
refusing to grant a permit to the demonstrators. 
Legitimating the consideration of intent at the prior-restraint 
stage will in all likelihood lead to serious abuses by officials and 
judges; such a dangerous principle is advocated only because planned 
violence is so very harmful to innocent individuals and to society as 
a whole, and is so very prevalent in the contemporary political cli-
mate. It is clear that safeguards against such abuse should be carefully 
constructed. Only a specific intent to cause violence, directed to the 
specific demonstration and manifested by specific plans, should 
suffice for a permit refusal or an injunction;107 a general intent ex-
trapolated from rhetoric or previous exploits should not be enough. 
Concrete evidence should also be required. In most instances this 
evidence would be the testimony of informers willing to drop their 
cover and be cross-examined or else recordings from wiretaps and 
eavesdropping devices installed pursuant to fourth amendment prob-
able cause standards; documented plans by the demonstrators to 
bring equipment such as helmets, baseball bats, and medics would 
107. Specific intent is a concept that is as prevalent in first amendment analysis 
as it is lacking in refinement. Probably the best way to approach the concept is to 
compare the indictments dismissed in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), 
with those remanded for new trials. See also the Court's treatment of the evidence 
in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). Other helpful discussions may be 
found in United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 176-79 (1st Cir. 1969); Z. CHAFEE, FREE 
SPEECH IN TIIE UNITED STATES 128-35 (2d ed. 1948). 
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also be relevant, though not conclusive, evidence of a specific intent 
to cause violence. 
It may be argued that a doctrine admitting the relevance of in-
tent but insisting on concrete evidence would provide an added in-
centive for police to utilize a number of unseemly methods of fact-
finding. It is unlikely, however, that the mere possibility of a permit 
denial would lead to the tapping, bugging, or infiltrating of groups 
that would not otherwise be thought to merit such expensive sur-
veillance. 
Thus, in cases in which the purpose and the message of a demon-
stration diverge, proof of specific intent on the part of the applicants 
to engage in or provoke violence should be held to be a constitution-
ally permissible reason for prohibiting an assemblage, either by in-
junction or permit denial. 
D. The Fear of a Hostile Audience 
It is a harsh fact of life that the exercise of speech by sincere, well-
behaved protestors is all too often disrupted by roving bands of 
toughs.108 Yet, it is unthinkable that such a "heckler's veto"100 should 
rise to the dignity of a constitutional principle. On the other hand, 
it would be almost perverse if the first amendment, with its identity 
as a child of the Enlightenment and its imagery of the market place 
of ideas, should wind up pointing the nation down the path of con-
frontation politics by limiting governmental power to prevent more-
or-less predictable bloodbaths. While this basic dilemma permeates 
all of the hostile-audience cases, it is not always of uniform severity. 
The calculus can vary depending, among other things, upon the 
number and behavior of the speakers, the nature of the speech, the 
availability of police resources, the amount of advance notice of the 
demonstration, the presence or absence of spectators sympathetic to 
the speakers, the feasibility of identifying the hecklers, and the 
location of the confrontation. 
In dictum, the Supreme Court has been forthright and bold in 
attacking the hostile-audience problem: "Constitutional rights may 
not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or ex-
ercise .... "110 The holdings on the subject, however, tend to be 
108. Probably the most dramatic example of this phenomenon was the recent series 
of escapades by the Hard-Hats, a group of New York City construction workers, 
against anti-war demonstrators. See N.Y. Times, May 9, 1970, at I, cols. 5-6. 
109. The phrase is Professor Kalven's. See H. KAI.VEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST 
.AMENDMENT 140-45 (1965). 
110. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963), quoted with approval in 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965). Similarly, the Court has stated, "It is 
firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be 
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of the hearers." 
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more evasive, inscrutable, and easily narrowed. In Hague v. CIO,111 
for example, a five-man majority held unconstitutional on its face a 
scheme providing that "a permit shall only be refused for the purpose 
of preventing riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage .... "112 
However, only three justices subscribed to the pertinent part of the 
one opinion which discussed the problem,113 and that opinion was 
careful to point out the many instances in the record of arbitrary 
suppression and to note that "the prohibition of all speaking will 
undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities."114 Similarly, Fiener v. 
New York,115 the only Supreme Court decision upholding a breach-
of-the-peace conviction in part because of the threat of a hostile audi-
ence, was carefully qualified. The majority observed that "the ordi-
nary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be 
allowed to silence a speaker"116 and stressed that in the case at bar the 
police were faced with an ongoing crisis. The majority also noted 
that the speaker had "[passed] the bounds of argument or persuasion 
and [undertaken] incitement to riot .... "117 
Last term the Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to clarify 
the law in this most troublesome area. Gregory v. City of Chicago118 
presented a fact situation that could have come from a law school 
examination hypothetical: eighty-five perfectly behaved civil rights 
protestors were picketing the home of the mayor of Chicago; a special 
detail of some one hundred Chicago policemen were making every 
conceivable effort to protect the protestors; a manageable situation 
existed for about one hour and then a crisis developed-the hostile 
crowd of onlookers from the neighborhood grew suddenly to two 
thousand, and eggs, rocks, and bottles were thrown at the demon-
strators by hecklers able to lose themselves in the crowd. The police 
finally asked the leader of the demonstration, Dick Gregory, to dis-
band his group. He refused, and as a consequence was convicted of 
disorderly conduct. The Illinois supreme court affirmed the convic-
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969), quoted with approval in Bachellar v. 
Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970). 
lll. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
112. 307 U.S. at 502. 
113. There was no opinion of the Court in Hague. Justice Roberts' opinion, 
discussing the Jersey City ordinance, was joined in by Justice Black and, in 
pertinent part, by Chief Justice Hughes. Justices Stone and Reed joined in the result, 
but only on the basis of a carefully detailed alternative theory of jurisdiction and a 
carefully maintained cryptic silence on the first amendment issue. 
114, 307 U.S. at 516. 
115. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
116, 340 U.S. at 320. 
117. 340 U.S. at 321. 
US. 394 U.S. 111 (1969). 
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tion after carefully interpreting the Supreme Court precedents and 
synthesizing them into a new test: 
It is only where there is an imminent threat of violence, the police 
have made all reasonable efforts to protect the demonstrators, the 
police have requested that the demonstration be stopped and ex-
plained the request, if there be time, and there is a refusal of the 
police request, that an arrest for an otherwise lawful demonstration 
may be made.110 
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction with a cryptic four-paragraph opinion that only added to the 
doctrinal confusion. One sentence-"[p Jetitioners' march, if peaceful 
and orderly, falls well within the sphere of conduct protected by the 
First Amendment"120--can be read to resolve with a flick of the 
·wrist not only the hostile-audience problem in all its complexity but 
also the almost equally difficult issue of residential picketing.121 A 
few sentences later, however, the majority seemed to rest its holding 
on the conclusion that the record was "totally devoid of evidentiary 
support"122 to establish the offense of disorderly conduct. Since the 
Illinois supreme court had included in its definition of disorderly 
conduct the refusal to obey a police request to stop a demonstration 
in the face- of imminent violence amid reasonable police efforts to 
contain the audience,123 and since the record amply supported a find-
ing of disorderly conduct as so defined, the "no evidence" holding 
of the Supreme Court would seem to be indefensible. It can be ex-
plained only by interpreting it as an oblique holding that the Illinois 
supreme court's redefinition of disorderly conduct could not be op-
erative, either because it came too late-after the charge to the jury 
and the verdict124-or because the presence or absence of a hostile 
audience can never be a factor in defining the freedom of speech. 
Since the former explanation-the tardiness of the redefinition of 
the offense-was listed in the last paragraph of the opinion as an 
independent ground for reversal, the most plausible interpretation 
of the Gregory holding is that it indeed redeems the promise of 
119. Chicago v. Gregory, 39 Ill. 2d 47, 60, 233 N.E.2d 422, 429 (1968). 
120. 394 U.S. at 112. 
121. See Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 
177 (1966); Comment, Picketing the Homes of Public Officials, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 
106 (1966). See also Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization To Rejuvenate Tenant 
Housing, 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622 (1969). 
122. The doctrine that the Court can reverse a conviction which is not based on any 
evidentiary support was initiated in Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). 
123. See text accompanying note 119 supra. 
124. See note 28 supra. 
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earlier dicta125 that the hostile audience is a constitutionally im-
permissible factor to be considered in regulating demonstrations. 
In the Court's most recent skirmish with the hostile-audience 
problem, Bachellar v. Maryland,126 it reversed a breach-of-the-peace 
conviction because the trial judge's charge to the jury would have 
permitted a guilty verdict for, among other things, "conduct of such 
nature as to affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness 
it and who may be disturbed or provoked to resentment because of 
it."127 The Court, speaking with rare unanimity, once more enun-
ciated a clear statement of principle: " '[i]t is firmly settled that 
under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be 
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some 
of their hearers' ... or simply because bystanders object to peaceful 
and orderly demonstrations."128 It is important to note, on the other 
hand, that none of the bystanders in Bachellar had translated his re-
sentment into action, that the Court's general and sweeping language 
stopped short of that particular permutation of the problem, and 
that the opinion curiously failed to cite Gregory. Nonetheless, it is 
probably accurate to read Bachellar as further support for the pro-
position that audience hostility can never justify a constriction of the 
right to assemble. 
It would be a mistake, however, to attach much importance to the 
Gregory and Bachellar holdings, for surely the hostile-audience prob-
lem is too subtle and too important to be conclusively resolved by 
the speculative and convoluted implications of those two cases. Per-
haps the hostile audience never should be a cognizable factor in 
classic free speech locations such as capitol grounds, parks, and major 
parade routes, but should be a relevant factor in such sensitive areas 
as residential neighborhoods and schoolyards, where many of the 
spectators may be "captive."129 In addition, perhaps the problem of 
an unexpected and uncontrollable hostile audience ought to justify 
some form of minimal, though involuntary, restraint such as placing 
the demonstrators in temporary protective custody, although this 
solution presents the danger that the minimal nature of the restraint 
may lead to its abuse by overly cautious, or personally hostile, police. 
125. See note 110 supra and accompanying text. 
126. 397 U.S. 564 (1970). 
127. 397 U.S. at 565 n.3. 
128. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969), quoted at 397 U.S. at 567. 
129. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 509 (1969), the Court appears to have adopted a test whereby serious disciplinary 
problems created by hostile classmates would justify restrictions of speech on school 
premises. See also Guzick v. Drebus, 305 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ohio 1969). 
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Whether or not these suggestions merit acceptance in dealing 
with an unanticipated and ongoing hostile mob, the problem is not 
so perplexing in the permit application context. Then, the hostile 
audience is not an actuality but merely a threat. The threat may be 
largely imagined or invented by paranoid or hostile city officials; it 
almost certainly will be exaggerated. Even if accurately gauged, the 
threat may never materialize, especially if the municipality makes 
it clear that it will support the demonstrators in their attempt to 
exercise their first amendment rights. Thus, at the permit application 
stage, the choice need not be between legalized vigilantism and blood-
bath, since the advance notice gives the city an adequate opportunity 
to protect the demonstrators-if necessary by requesting the gov-
ernor to call out the National Guard, which, after all, ought to be 
employed as readily to protect human beings exercising their con-
stitutional rights as it is to protect merchandise. In contrast to the 
on-the-spot, uncontrollable emergency, it would seem to be a greater 
spur to vigilantism and a greater symbolic defeat for free speech if 
the legal system were to give in to a threat that could be contained, 
albeit by drastic action. 
Admittedly, ignoring the threat of a hostile audience in the 
permit application context gives rise to some special problems. The 
lead time makes possible the emergence of a poker mentality 
whereby both the protestors and their opponents may become so 
steeped in their own bluffs that they are forced, against their better 
judgment, to play their hands. Also, public outrage at property 
damage stemming from the demonstration is likely to be greater 
when "there was time to prevent it." 
These considerations should not, however, obscure the fact that 
in the permit application context the essential regulatory interest is 
not the prevention of violence, but rather the avoidance of cost-the 
cost of adequately policing the event. The weighty factor of violence 
prevention can be added to the scales only in diluted form-the 
possibility that officials may, even playing it safe, underestimate the 
law-enforcement resources that may be needed. This combination of 
economizing and fear of miscalculation would seem always to be out-
weighed by the speech interest, not to mention the interest in avoid-
ing any incentive to vigilante activity. At the very least this is true 
when the demonstrators have not unreasonably increased the law-
enforcement cost by baiting the hecklers, employing a cast of thou-
sands, or returning to demonstrate for several days in succession. 
Moreover, even when these three variables enter the picture and the 
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protestors can no longer pose as innocents abroad, it is still preferable 
to keep the hostile-audience factor out of the balancing equation, 
since limitations more susceptible to objective application-cost 
assessments,130 restrictions on repetition,131 emergency curfews132-
can adequately protect the city's fiscal needs and regulatory interests. 
There is no pragmatic need to sacrifice, and indeed there is every 
symbolic and administrative reason to preserve, the absolute purity 
of the principle already recognized by several lower courts,133 that 
the fear of a hostile audience is never to be considered in ruling upon 
permit applications or granting injunctions against demonstrations. 
E. The Pas_t Conduct of the Applicant 
Evidence of past conduct can be highly relevant in predicting the 
consequences of allowing a particular demonstration. In the context 
of group activity, such evidence can bear not only on the intentions 
of the leaders, but also on their ability to control their legions.134 No 
doubt, standards of the "good character" genre lend themselves read-
ily to disguised censorship,135 but that danger can be minimized by 
limiting the decision-maker's consideration of past conduct to that 
which has been adjudicated in criminal proceedings or at permit-
revocation hearings with adequate procedural safeguards. A "mora-
torium" on demonstrating by those who have previously exceeded the 
bounds of legality may be the only effective regulatory weapon 
against those demonstrators whose violations are too petty as a matter 
of individual fairness or martyr-avoidance strategy to justify incar-
ceration, yet are, from the viewpoint of a well-funded movement, 
worth the cost of any fines. 
Ironically, it may be that a constitutional ban on considering 
past conduct at the prior-restraint stage would be harmful to free 
speech. City officials and judges will have impressions about the past 
130. See pt. II. H. infra. 
131. See text accompanying note 142 infra. 
132. See pt. II. F. infra. 
133. See, e.g., Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 977 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Hurwitt 
v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 
100 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Rockwell v. Morris, 12 App. Div. 2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1961). 
134. Cf. Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 1965), in 
which the court stated that a permit cannot be denied simply because the applicants 
do not have an established organization. 
135. See Smith v. University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777, 782 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); 
Norton v. Ensor, 269 F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1967); Evans v. Lepore, 26 N.J. Misc. 215, 
59 A.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Borough of Edgewater v. Cox, 123 N.J.L. 212, 8 A.2d 
375 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1939); City of Bowling Green v. Lodico, 11 Ohio St. 2d 135, 228 
N.E.2d 325 (1967). 
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conduct of would-be demonstrators and are likely to be affected by 
those impressions no matter how objective the formal standards for 
decision-making may be. It can be argued that legitimating the con-
sideration of properly adjudicated past conduct may satisfy the urge 
to take such conduct into account and may also give the applicants 
the opportunity to correct any misconceptions that may reside in the 
rumor-fed minds of the decision-makers. Also, a prohibition on con-
sidering past conduct at the prior-restraint stage might create pres-
sures at other checkpoints to keep potential troublemakers off the 
streets. Constitutional supervision may be less effective if the felt 
need to control future demonstrations should enter into decisions to 
arrest, press charges, set bail, or impose probation conditions. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the problem of the consider-
ation of past conduct at the prior-restraint stage only once. The de-
fendant in Kunz v. New York136 was denied a permit because he had 
violated the terms of a previous permit by ridiculing "two great re-
ligions. "137 In affirming his conviction for speaking without a permit, 
the New York Court of Appeals held that a previous revocation "for 
good reasons" is a permissible standard for denying a permit request, 
at least when "[t]he commissioner had no reason to assume, and no 
promise was made, that defendant wanted a new permit for any uses 
different from the disorderly ones he had been guilty of before."138 
In reversing the New York court, the Supreme Court limited its 
holding to a very narrow ground: since the statute set out no stan-
dards for revocation, to use revocation itself as a standard for denying 
a permit was simply a two-step process of unbridled administrative 
discretion.139 The Court's dictum, however, was expansive: "[t]he 
court below has mistakenly derived support for its conclusions from 
the evidence produced at the trial that appellant's religious meetings 
had, in the past, caused some disorder. There are appropriate public 
remedies to protect the peace and order of the community if appel-
lant's speeches should result in disorder and violence."140 While it 
can be argued that the New York court's reliance on past conduct was 
unconstitutional only because the permit scheme did not contain 
objective standards for considering such conduct, it is significant that 
the Supreme Court punctuated its mention of "appropriate public 
remedies" with three consecutive references to the distinction be-
136. 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 
137. People v. Kunz, 300 N.Y. 273, 277, 90 N.E.2d 455, 457 (1949). 
138. People v. Kunz, 300 N.Y. 273, 277-78, 90 N.E.2d.455, 457 (1949). 
139. 340 U.S. at 293. 
140. 340 U.S. at 294. 
August 1970] Prior Restraints on Demonstrations 1517 
nveen prior restraints and subsequent punishments.141 It is more 
natural, therefore, to read the Kunz dictum to stand for the proposi-
tion that the denial of a demonstration permit can never be pre-
dicated on past conduct, even if that conduct has been adjudicated 
with procedural safeguards and seems highly relevant for predicting 
future behavior. 
An across-the-board prohibition on considering past conduct at the 
prior-restraint stage would have one unmistakable virtue: simplicity. 
That is no mean credential for a rule of law that must be administered 
in many instances by municipal officials with no legal training and 
almost always in situations in which passions and paranoia run high 
and time is at a premium. Moreover, even if the Court's assertion in 
Kunz concerning the adequacy of subsequent punishment must be 
viewed with skepticism, it does serve as a telling reminder that this 
problem is properly viewed as one part of the monumental debate 
over preventive detention: when can the genetic, psychological, socio-
logical, or statistical propability that a citizen will commit a crime in 
the future justify punishing him, by incarceration or diminution of 
his constitutional rights, before he commits that crime? There is no 
need, however, to resolve the past conduct issue on such a simple 
plane as the simplicity of a per se rule or on such a complex plane 
as the moral propriety of preventive detention. Three intermediate 
levels of inquiry can be employed: (1) Is past conduct of consistent 
probative value for predicting the consequences of granting permits? 
If not, can rules be formulated for isolating the past conduct that is 
of predictive value? If not, can the determination safely be com-
mitted to administrative discretion? (2) Is there a better stage in the 
process of demonstration regulation at which to consider the pre-
dictive value of past conduct? (3) How would legitimating the con-
sideration of past conduct at the prior-restraint stage affect admin-
istrative behavior at other points in the demonstration regulation 
process? 
First, it is evident that the predictive value of past conduct fluc-
tuates greatly from case to case. The outcome of each mass gathering 
depends upon a myriad of intangible variables: the mood of the 
speak.er and of the crowd, the civility of the police, the weather, the 
reactions of bystanders, the presence or absence of the media, the 
power struggles bet,;veen the various protest leaders, the symbolic 
significance of the event, the machinations of agents-provocateur 
attempting to discredit the group. In the context of mass demonstra-
141. 340 U.S. at 294. 
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tions, the relevant individual conduct is most often the result of 
excitement and overreaction; the criminal liability is frequently of 
the vicarious or collective variety-mob action, refusal to disperse, 
unlawful assembly, breach of the peace, obstructing public passage-
ways. To predict future behavior on the basis of these indices is to 
engage in nothing more than soothsaying. 
There are, however, specific individuals or groups for whom this 
generalization will not be true: the one-theme religious zealot; the 
political martyr-of-the-moment who may be able to ignite the most 
volatile passions in his followers merely by stating his cause; the 
avowedly violent group such as the Weathermen (whose revolution-
ary appeal apparently depends on proving that intangible variables 
have nothing to do with the outcome of its demonstrations). Were 
it possible to legitimate consideration of prior conduct in these ex-
ceptional situations without opening up a Pandora's box of admin-
istrative discretion, the argument for doing so would be very strong 
indeed. 
Conceivably, consideration of past conduct could be limited to 
convictions for demonstration-related offenses that entail personal 
action rather than vicarious or group responsibility-for example, 
malicious destruction of property, assault, or resisting arrest. Also, 
something like a habitual-offender concept could be employed: three 
prior assault convictions might afford a sound basis for predicting 
misbehavior at a proposed demonstration whereas one conviction 
might not. In addition, a "statute of limitations" of, for instance, two 
years might reasonably be adopted so that convictions stemming from 
a different protest era would not count against the demonstrators. 
One drawback, however, of a rule that would permit this limited 
consideration of past conduct at the prior-restraint stage would be 
the creation of some undesirable incentives: prosecutors hoping to 
prevent future demonstrations would be encouraged to go for con-
victions rather than to drop charges, and accused demonstrators 
hoping to preserve their future options would be encouraged to con-
test criminal charges rather than plead guilty-both pressures in the 
direction of further burdening scarce judicial resources. In addition, 
even a carefully circumscribed legitimation of considering past con-
duct might encourage officials improperly and covertly to consider 
other kinds of past conduct such as general reputation, arrests, and 
unrelated convictions. 
Moreover, even if this circumscribed consideration of past con-
duct at the prior-restraint stage did not have such serious drawbacks, 
there is a preferable alternative: if the right to demonstrate is to be 
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limited on the basis of past conduct, this should be done at the 
sentencing stage as part of the punishment for the initial conduct. 
Incarceration is not the only alternative: should mercy or martyr-
avoidance be of high priority, probation could be conditioned on a 
promise by the defendant to refrain from participation in future 
demonstrations.142 This control mechanism is not without risks of 
its own, the most serious being that its very character as a more 
lenient alternative may lead to its careless use by judges and passive 
acceptance by defendants.143 But at least the initial decision is always 
made by a judge, and always in the course of regular rather than 
time-pressured proceedings; there is a fixed duration to the restric-
tion; and the determination is not made with an eye to a specific, 
upcoming, and unpopular demonstration. Flexibility can be achieved 
by permitting the probation officer to grant a temporary waiver of 
the conditions of probation, although this power is likely to be ex-
ercised too cautiously to be of much importance. A final consider-
ation is economy. Limiting participation in future demonstrations 
at the sentencing stage merely requires one more decision concerning 
a defendant already before the court, whereas looking into the past 
conduct at the prior-restraint stage may require an enormous extra 
expenditure of time. Thus, if consideration of past conduct is ever 
to be a control mechanism in regulating demonstrations, it should be 
utilized only at the sentencing stage. A permit never should be 
denied because of the past conduct of the applicant. 
A further reason for this conclusion is that the circumscribed con-
sideration of past conduct would be enforceable only against specific 
individuals, not against entire groups-a circumstance that seriously 
diminishes the violence prevention advantages that might serve to 
justify the consideration of past conduct in the first place. Not only 
would it be unfair to deny a group the right to demonstrate merely 
because a few of its members had the requisite multiple convictions, 
it would also be a futile exercise because front groups could be 
created at will. It would be possible to keep multiple offenders off 
the speakers' platform-more difficult than to keep them out of the 
parade-but it would seem to be difficult to defend on violence 
prevention grounds the practice of allowing the group to congregate 
while making martyrs of some of its members. 
142. This practice raises extremely difficult first amendment questions that are 
beyond the scope of the present inquiry. For present purposes it is sufficient to note 
that, to date, courts and commentators have found the practice permissible. See 
United States v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1969); Note, Judicial Review of 
Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 203-04 (1967). 
143. There may also be serious procedural problems in obtaining appellate review. 
See Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 181, 188-96 (1967). 
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F. A Background of Violence 
The concerns about message, purpose, hostile audience, and past 
conduct all have a common denominator: the fear of violence. In the 
year 1970 no extraordinary powers of persuasion are needed to make 
the point that the prevention of violence is of the highest priority-
indeed it occupies a preferred position-in a civilized society. The 
preceding four sections have subdivided this concern about violence 
into its component parts, and liave treated them individually. The 
conclusions have been heavily influenced by the danger of faulty pre-
dictions of violence, whet.lier such predictions are caused by paranoia, 
bad faith, laziness, or incompetence. Now violence prevention must 
be treated as a cognate concern, not in a context of speculation, but 
in one of gruesome actuality. Surely the balancing calculus must 
change when protestors walk through a world of broken glass, drawn 
bayonets, and tear gas in order to file their permit applications. 
The Supreme Court's most direct pronouncement on the matter 
is not especially helpful; the Court finds the problem "thorny."144 
Cases from another judicial era hold that a governor's declaration of 
"martial law" or other invocation of emergency powers, at least if 
backed up by an actual deployment of the National Guard, jus-
tifies some redefinition of traditional constitutional safeguards, but 
"[w ]hat are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether 
or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial 
questions."145 The most extreme case on the subject is ft.foyer v. 
Peabody,146 in which a unanimous Supreme Court gave its blessing 
to the preventive detention-2½ months without bail or criminal 
charges-of a union leader after labor violence led to the calling out 
of troops and the declaration of a state of insurrection. There is no 
way of knowing whether the Moyer holding could command a major-
ity of the Court today, or whether an emergency declaration not in-
volving actual military deployment can justify exceptions to normal 
Bill of Rights requirements.147 
The Court has indicated in the context of labor picketing that, 
even in the absence of a formal emergency, a background of violence 
is a relevant factor in interpreting the first amendment. The leading 
144. Carroll v. President & Commrs., 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968). 
145. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932). 
146. 212 U.S. 78 (1909). 
147. See generally Note, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77 YALE L.J. 1560, 
1566-68 (1968); Comment, The Riot Curfew, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 450, 486-87 n.202 
(1969); Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Bases of Governors' Emergency Powers, 
64 MICH. L. REv. 290 (1965). 
• 
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case, Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, In-
corporated,148 stands as a reminder that violence, either calculated 
or wanton, is hardly a recent arrival on the American political scene: 
Besides peaceful picketing of the stores handling Meadowmoor's 
products, the master found that there had been violence on a con-
siderable scale. Witnesses testified to more than fifty instances of 
window-smashing; explosive bombs caused substantial injury to the 
plants of Meadowmoor and another dairy using the vendor system 
and to five stores; stench bombs were dropped in five stores; three 
trucks of vendors were wrecked, seriously injuring one driver, and 
another was driven into a river; a store was set on fire and in large 
measure ruined; two trucks of vendors were burned; a storekeeper 
and a truckdriver were severely beaten; workers at a dairy which, 
like Meadowmoor, used the vendor system were held with guns and 
severely beaten about the head while being told to 'join the union'; 
carloads of men followed vendor's trucks, threatened the drivers, and 
in one instance shot at the truck and driver. In more than a dozen 
of these occurrences, involving window-smashing, bombings, burn-
ings, the wrecking of trucks, shootings and beatings, there was testi-
mony to identify the wrongdoers ~s union men.149 
Against this background of violence, the Supreme Court held that all 
picketing, including peaceful picketing, could be enjoined. The 
Court noted that "[t]hese acts of violence are neither episodic nor 
isolated,"1150 that "it could justifiably be concluded that the momen-
tum of fear generated by past violence would survive even though 
future picketing might be wholly peaceful,''1151 and that the injunc-
tion "is justified only by the violence that induced it and only so long 
as it counteracts a continuing intimidation."1152 "Continuing intimi-
dation" was found to exist in spite of the fact that all of the truck-
seizures and most of the window-smashings and bombings had taken 
place three years before the injunction was issued, and the only in-
stances of violence that had occurred in the preceding year were seven 
window-smashings and t\vo store-bombings.1153 
Moyer, Meadowmoor, and related Supreme Court cases1154 are 
helpful on the problem of violence and mass demonstrations only at 
148. 312 U.S. 287 (1941). 
149. 312 U.S. at 291-92. 
150. 312 U.S. at 295. 
151. 312 U.S. at 294. 
152. 312 U.S. at 298. 
153. 312 U.S. at 314-15 n.16 Gustice Black, dissenting). 
154. E.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (pattern of violence sufficient 
to divest NLRB of jurisdiction over on-site picketing not established). See also 
United Farm Workers Organization Comm., AFL-CIO v. La Casita Farms, 439 
S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). 
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a very high level of generality. It is good to know that the invocations 
of martial law and emergency powers support some restrictions on 
constitutional liberties, but that the ultimate decision whether to 
impose restrictions remains in the hands of the judiciary, and entails 
the familiar reconciliation of individual and societal demands. It is 
also good to know that speech activities may lose their protected qual-
ity if they are related to violent activities in some measure of causal-
ity, proximity, and continuity. On the other hand, so much has 
transpired in the field of civil liberties since Moyer was decided in 
1909, and labor disputes are so focused, so drawn out, and so colored 
by economic coercion, that any attempt to apply the narrow holdings 
and doctrines of Moyer and other labor cases in the mass-demonstra-
tions context must take on a distinctly Procrustean quality. 
Approaching the issue, then, with only the broadest of precedential 
guidelines, how can a back.ground of violence be made an admissible 
consideration without giving city officials a cornucopia of abusable 
discretion? Two checking devices might be employed. The first 
would attempt to define a threshold of violence-in terms of inten-
sity, dispersion, geographic and temporal proximity, and continuity 
-that must exist before the factor could be considered at all. The 
second checking device would be similar in spirit, but would mark 
the threshold of admissibility not directly by trying to measure the 
violence, but rather indirectly by conditioning any limitation on the 
right of assembly on a corresponding willingness by the government 
to take other drastic and expensive measures to control the situation, 
such as calling out the National Guard, imposing a curfew, or ban-
ning all public meetings. 
Directly defining the threshold of violence is the more difficult 
approach, but a permit denial or injunction based on such an effort 
should be upheld as long as certain definitional strictures are ob-
served. First, the violence must be serious enough to cause either 
personal injuries requiring hospitalization or substantial property 
damage in dollar terms-not simply a few broken windows. The 
violence also must be in the same general area as that requested for 
the proposed demonstration, because a change of setting frequently 
breaks the pattern of violence by altering such variables as symbolic 
targets, potential victims, hecklers, and hideouts. Furthermore, the 
violence must be continual enough to constitute a pattern or back-
ground; while one unfortunate occurrence should not be enough, two 
successive days of violence can be said to establish such a pattern. 
Finally, the violence must be recent. To borrow the language, al-
though not the holding, of Meadowmoor, there must be a "momen-
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tum of fear,''155 a "continuing intimidation."156 Generally, this will 
mean that the violence must have occurred within the preceding 
week. The city should not, however, be required to show that the 
particular applicants were associated with the previous violence: 
when conditions are severe enough to meet the foregoing criteria, 
municipal officials should have the power to prevent all mass 
gatherings. 
Another way to gauge the background of violence is to look to the 
other means the government is willing to employ in order to counter 
the threat of more violence. Probably the most drastic means is the 
imposition of a general curfew. If a city is willing to subject its law-
abiding citizens to the tremendous inconvenience and expense caused 
by a general curfew,m then the claim that there is a significant 
background of violence gains a good deal of credibility. Indeed, such 
a claim is so credible that a per se rule is justified: it should be con-
stitutionally permissible to prohibit any demonstration in an area 
where, and at an hour when, a general curfew is in force. Such pro-
hibitions could be challenged only by directly attacking the constitu-
tional validity of the curfew itself,158 or by showing that the curfew 
was being enforced so haphazardly that it was no longer a meaningful 
credibility check. One difficulty with a per se rule would be that at 
the time of the prior-restraint decision it would not be known 
whether the curfew would still be in effect on the date proposed for 
the demonstration, but that problem can be solved by issuing condi-
tional permits and injunctions.159 
Another measure sometimes taken by cities to counter a threat 
of impending violence is a ban on all public meetings, or, more 
drastically, on all congregations of more than a given number of 
people.160 The imposition of such a mini-curfew would mean that the 
regularly scheduled P.T.A. meeting or Lions Club picnic could not 
be held, and to that extent it would be somewhat of a credibility 
check on the city government. But these inconveniences are com-
paratively minor, especially since there may be no scheduled meet-
ings for the typically short duration of the curfew and since any 
events that might be planned could usually be rescheduled. Thus, a 
155. 312 U.S. at 294. 
156, 312 U.S. at 298. 
157. See Note, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77 YALE L.J. 1560, 1564-65 (1968). 
158. See id. at 1570-73. 
159. The standard parade permit might contain the proviso that it is void when 
a general curfew is in effect. 
160. Several cities have employed such measures. See Note, supra note 157, at 1561 
n.6. 
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city's willingness to prohibit all public meetings or sizable gather-
ings cannot be regarded as an adequate index of the gravity of the 
situation; nothing short of a general curfew should, by itself, justify 
a permit denial for, or an injunction against, the staging of a pro-
posed demonstration. 
A third extraordinary means of violence prevention is the calling 
out of the National Guard. As is the case with the imposition of a 
general curfew, such action is costly and highly disruptive of the lives 
of average citizens; governments are not likely to take this course of 
action unless the need is real. On the other hand, a Guard call-out 
is not so safe a credibility check as a general curfew since the Guard 
deployment is not subject to any kind of meaningful direct challenge 
in the courts and does not necessarily inconvenience a broad segment 
of the population. In recent years there have been a number of 
instances-in Wilmington, New Haven, and Washington, D.C., to 
name a few-in which the National Guard was called out when 
there was no immediate background of actual violence, but rather 
only an apprehension thereof. Moreover, it might conceivably be 
argued that the presence of the National Guard ought to be a factor 
in favor of allowing the demonstration, since then any incipient 
violence that might arise could be more easily contained. In light of 
these conflicting considerations, the case for giving special significance 
to a Guard call-out---either in the form of a per se rule or a presump-
tion-is not persuasive. 
Thus, the first amendment should be interpreted to allow munici-
palities to refuse to issue permits or to obtain injunctions against 
demonstrations whenever a serious immediate background of violence 
can be established. This background should be provable by the city 
in either one of two ways: (I) direct evidence of the violence in terms 
of intensity, dispersion, geographic and temporal proximity, and 
continuity; or (2) indirect evidence of the seriousness of the situation 
as shown by the city's willingness to impose a general curfew on its 
citizens. Declarations of martial law and decisions to deploy the 
National Guard should not alter the calculus. 
G. Failure To Make a Timely Application for a Permit 
Most parade permit ordinances require applicants to submit their 
requests a certain period of time in advance of the scheduled event.101 
161. Of twenty-two municipalities responding to an inquiry on this point, thirteen 
have advance-filing requirements: Albany (6 hours), Atlanta (5 days), Berkeley (20 
days for parades, 48 hours for meetings), Cleveland (5 days), Kansas City, Mo. (48 
hours), Los Angeles (40 days), Louisville (5 days), Memphis (3 days), New York 
(36 hours), Portland (60 days), San Antonio (15 days), San Francisco (24 hours), 
Seattle (48 hours). Personal correspondence on file with the author. 
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This lead time can be important for a number of reasons. It can 
enable city officials to evaluate the competing public uses, to put the 
police department on notice concerning how many men will have to 
be on duty, and to prepare a temperate response to the protestors' 
demands and tactics. Advance notice can also be helpful to the news 
media in assigning reporters and transporting equipment. In addi-
tion, public inconvenience can be minimized if uninterested citizens 
can be warned in advance to take a different route or to shop on 
another day. 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue whether these 
advance-filing requirements are consistent with the first amendment. 
Recently, a federal district judge in Mississippi struck down a one-
hour advance-notice requirement and that decision was affirmed per 
curiam by the Fifth Circuit.162 However, the opinion of the district 
judge appears to have been strongly influenced by the unique context 
of the case: "there was nothing about this particular demonstration 
that required extra police vigilance" ;163 and "it would seem that the 
city officials, in enacting, enforcing, and prosecuting under this ordi-
nance, were motivated primarily by a desire to impede and, if 
possible, totally halt all organized civil rights marches within the 
corporate limits."164 A thirty-to-sixty-day advance-filing requirement 
has also been struck down,165 but time periods of twenty-four166 and 
forty-eight167 hours have been upheld, the latter by the Second Cir-
cuit "as applied to a demonstration, such as this one, that had been 
planned well in advance .... "168 
As a basic constitutional proposition, forty-eight hours should be 
the maximum limit for per se advance-filing requirements. A longer 
lead time is of course desirable from the viewpoint of both the 
162. Robinson v. Coopwood, 292 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Miss. 1968), afjd. per curiam, 
415 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1969). See Note, The Constitutionality of a Requirement To 
Give Notice Before Marching, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 270 (1969). 
163. 292 F. Supp. at 933. 
164. 292 F. Supp. at 934. 
165. York v. City of Danville, 207 Va. 665, 152 S.E.2d 259 (1967). The court 
suggested that a lead-time requirement of twenty-four hours or less would be upheld. 
166. Commonwealth v. Hessler, 141 Pa. Super. 421, 15 A.2d 486 (1940). 
167. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). 
168. 407 F.2d at 84. See also Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d 
Cir. 1968) ("[s]uch notice requirements must be examined with special care in view 
of the tendency to abuse'); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 972-74 (N.D. Miss. 
1969). In A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1969), referring 
to the special need to "assure the safety of the President," the court allowed enforcement 
of a National Park Service fifteen-day advance-filing requirement for demonstrations 
near the White House. Recently, President Nixon graciously waived the requirement 
to allow Jane Fonda, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and a hundred thousand other demonstrators 
to express their dismay over the United States' intervention in Cambodia. N.Y. Times, 
May 10, 1970, § I, at I, col. 8; id., § 1, at 24, col. 6. 
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demonstrators and the municipality, especially if the dispute will be 
brought to the courts. But with regard to a blanket refusal by the 
city even to consider an application for a permit, the overriding 
administrative considerations begin to fade out rapidly beyond the 
forty-eight-hour mark. Policemen and newsmen are frequently de-
ployed on shorter notice, and the mammoth demonstrations which 
require extraordinary policing generally take more than forty-eight 
hours to organize; the data on competing uses can be researched in 
a day or two; the most effective warning to disinterested citizens will 
likely be at the same time and place twenty-four hours before the 
demonstration ("tomorrow at this time this street will be closed"). 
By the same token, while many municipalities seem to favor shorter 
advance-notice provisions,169 or none at all,17° a city's claim that it 
needs or greatly benefits from more than one day's notice before a 
demonstration is certainly credible, and should ordinarily satisfy the 
demands of the first amendment. 
Special problems are posed by demonstrations which are either 
spontaneous or organized on short notice in response either to local 
grievances-such as the arrest of a protest leader-or to monumental 
national events-such as the assassination of Martin Luther King or 
the intervention in Cambodia. These spontaneous gatherings are in 
many ways the most genuine form of expression-a refreshing change 
from the carefully orchestrated "pseudo-events"171 that play such a 
dominant role in the contemporary political scenario. Moreover, be-
cause emotions run high on these spontaneous occasions, it is espe-
cially important that the permit process, with whatever semblance 
of notice and cooperation it can contribute, be workable. City officials 
will often waive the lead-time requirement out of empathy or fear,172 
and a few ordinances provide explicitly for an exception to the 
advance-filing requirement for "good cause"173 or "in the discretion 
of the Chief of Police for any unexpected occasion."174 Nevertheless, 
some municipalities retain such a boundless capacity for insensitiv-
ity175 that a permit denial under such circumstances may sometimes 
169. E.g., Albany, New York City, San Francisco. See note 161 supra. 
170. E.g., Birmingham, Boston, Boulder, Colo., Champaign, Ill., Dallas, Denver, 
Ithaca, N.Y., Madison, Oakland. Nine of twenty-two responding to the inquiry. 
See note 161 supra. 
171. See D. BooRSTIN, THE !MAGE (2d ed. 1964). 
172. Such subjective pressures operate not only on city bureaucrats, but on the 
judiciary as well. See text following note 272 infra. 
173. San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance 36221, § 4(3), Feb. 15, 1968. 
174. SEATTLE, WASH., Crrr CODE § 21.60.080 (1967). See also Los ANGELES, CALIF,, 
MUNICIPAL CODE § 103.111(0) (1969). 
175. The Austin, Texas, City Council recently invoked its fifteen-day advance-filing 
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demand judicial attention. With a forty-eight-hour advance-notice 
provision, further constitutional intervention should be confined to 
exceptional cases in which unforeseen events of obvious importance 
make immediate protest efficacious. In those few instances, however, 
the considerations of municipal efficiency and public convenience 
that justify an advance-filing requirement under normal conditions 
must give way before the weighty first amendment interest in spon-
taneous expression. 
H. Refusal or Inability To Pay the Costs Associated 
with the Demonstration 
Policing demonstrations costs money, as does administering a 
permit system. Who should pay? The statute upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Cox v. New Hampshire116 required marchers to pay the 
costs-up to 300 dollars-of policing the event.177 In movie censor-
ship cases, lower courts have upheld both flat permit fees and fees 
based on film footage.178 The Supreme Court cases striking down 
"speech taxes"179 have all carefully distinguished assessments reason-
ably related to administrative costs. Thus, the principle of pay-as-
you-go, even for "free" speech, appears to be well established. 
There is more behind the principle than sterile precedent. User 
taxes are often hailed as the fairest of all.180 Moreover, if the city is 
forced to defray administrative costs, it is likely to be more resistant 
to permit requests-at a cost to both sides in that energies which 
could be devoted to cooperation and planning are wasted in litiga-
tion. Large and frequent demonstrations can severely strain a police 
department, making patrolmen assigned to such events resentful and 
vindictive, and diminishing the level of protection afforded in other 
requirement to deny a permit to a crowd of twenty thousand citizens seeking to 
march in protest against the Cambodian intervention. The local federal district judge 
ordered that the permit be issued. Ad Hoc Strike Comm. of the Univ. of Texas v. 
Miles, No. A-70-CA-33 (W.D. Tex., May 8, 1970). See also Houston Peace Coalition v. 
Houston City Council, 310 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex. 1970). 
176. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
177. 312 U.S. at 572. 
178. Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966); Universal 
Film Exchanges, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 288 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1968). In 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56-57 n.3 (1965), the petitioners claimed that the 
permit fee was an impermissible "speech tax," but the Court did not reach the issue. 
179. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Jones v. Opelika, 319 
U.S. 103 (1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942); Grosjean v. American 
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See also NAACP v. City of Chester, 253 F. Supp. 707 
(E.D. Pa. 1966), in which the court struck down a $25 fee for operating a sound 
truck absent any showing by the city that the fee was reasonably related to the cost 
of enforcing the soundtruck ordinance. 
180. See R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF Ptmuc FINANCE ch. 4 (1959), and references 
cited therein. 
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neighborhoods. At some point, repeated demonstrations can amount 
to an act of political ransom, with the protestors holding the city's 
police resources hostage until their demands are met. Even if the prob-
lem of economic coercion is disregarded, it can be argued that the 
resource allocation decision should balance not only immediately 
competing uses but also total use over time, and that any rationing 
system other than the market would be hopelessly complicated and 
inefficient. Charging for police protection can also be defended as 
a check against frivolous demonstrations and as a fair assessment for 
the valuable media time that is often a consequence and, indeed, a 
purpose of mass gatherings. The contention that such an assessment 
for exercising the privilege of free speech discriminates against the 
poor can be countered by a special provision in the scheme for in-
digents and by the observation that the rich are also deterred from 
demonstrating by the economists' concept of opportunity cost.181 
There are precedents, however, that point in the opposite direc-
tion. The cases securing lawyers and transcripts for indigent defen-
dants,182 at the very least, undermine the absolute integrity of the 
pay-as-you-go principle, even though they are distinguishable on a 
number of grounds: nonindigents still have to pay, the want is more 
important (or at least more strongly felt), and the need for legal 
services arises only because of governmental initiative. Moreover, 
read broadly, the indigent-defendant cases may stand for the proposi-
tion that the level of assertion of constitutional rights should not be 
affected by personal budgetary considerations-that nonindigents 
are not entitled to free counsel only because they appreciate the value 
of the right involved and are willing to pay for it-a happy circum-
stance not present for other more amorphous rights such as voting 
and speech. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the 
majority opinion in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,183 in 
which the Court struck down the Virginia poll tax in state elections, 
appears to proceed on the assumption that even an exemption for 
indigents would not make the poll tax constitutional; even the rich 
cannot be made to pay a dollar and a half to vote. 
The right to assemble, like the right to vote, is the kind of right 
about which constitutional theorists wax eloquent184 but for which 
181. For example, a partner of Sullivan &: Cromwell must forgo hundreds of dollars 
in billable time in order to attend a "support our boys" rally. 
182. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
183. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
184. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 7, at 32, 
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many people are unwilling to pay; these rights require special judicial 
attention not because they are so fundamental, but because they are 
so unappreciated. Unlike voting, however, it cannot be said that 
society has a positive stake in the maximum assertion of the right to 
demonstrate. Rather, the right of assembly is somewhat like a demand 
deposit; it can exist only because not everyone will claim it at the 
same time. When the additional element of violence potential is 
considered, the conclusion seems warranted that assembly is indeed 
a right that must be rationed. While other rationing systems can be 
imagined-for example, a limit on the number of major demonstra-
tions in which a person could participate during a given time period, 
with the city having the burden of enjoining specific individuals 
from further participation after proving that they had exhausted 
their quotas-a system based on willingness to pay, with an indigency 
provision, would seem to be not merely permissible, but optimal. 
Unfortunately, the fairness of a payment system in principle does 
not necessarily mean that such a system will be fair in practice. A 
burdensome system of administration could undercut the theoretical 
protection for indigents, could filter out not only frivolous demon-
strators but also those who happen to be financially cautious or busy, 
and could provide hostile city officials with an ideal low-visibility 
censorship technique in the form of inflated estimates of required 
police resources. Even a payment system administered in complete 
good faith would force demonstrators to pay in part both for the 
paranoia of police officials and for the antics of hecklers, since both 
would increase the number of officers necessarily assigned to an event. 
These dangers attendant to a pay-as-you-go system are real. They 
cannot be adequately guarded against by a case-by-case judicial 
review of rejected indigency claims and police-assignment decisions. 
The burden of delay and doubt must be placed on the city. One 
permissible scheme would be to require the city to issue a police-cost 
estimate with every permit granted, then to require the demonstrators 
to make a good faith effort to collect the necessary amount by what-
ever means they choose-passing the hat, charging admission, 
soliciting advance donations-and finally to hold the sponsors of the 
demonstration criminally liable upon proof by the city that a good-
faith collection effort was not made. Admittedly, the good faith 
requirement would be difficult to enforce; the sponsors' exhortation 
to "give generously" might have a disingenuous ring when the crowd 
knows that the police are to be the ultimate recipients of its largess. 
Municipalities may be able to devise more effective cost-assess-
ment schemes that are no more inhibiting to demonstrators and are 
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no more subject to abuse than the one outlined above. But any 
alternative that is more burdensome to the assertion of the right of 
assembly should be struck down. In particular, requirements of 
advance payment or suretyship should not pass first amendment 
scrutiny. Whatever these advance-payment schemes may gain for the 
city in financial security must necessarily be outweighed by the 
abundant opportunities they offer for abuse by unsympathetic city 
officials. The outcome of this balance cannot be in doubt when it is 
remembered that the assessment is justified in the first place not as a 
matter of municipal fiscal integrity, but to prevent economic coercion 
and the promiscuous assertion of rights. 
Although the common practice among municipalities is to accept 
applications and issue permits free of charge, a few municipalities 
charge a small fee to defray the costs of administering the permit 
system itself.185 A constitutional challenge to the assessment of these 
fees could be mounted, based on Harper.186 The issue presented by 
these administration fees is different from the police-cost issue in 
that payment of the administration fees is sought in advance, and 
the political-ransom and police-resentment rationales are inapplic-
able. The assessment of such fees can, however, be defended as a 
minimal commitment check-especially in a city that does not 
charge for police-and as a rationing device that is proper for mass 
demonstrations but not for voting, thereby distinguishing Harper. 
Furthermore, the primary objection to an advance-payment require-
ment-the danger of abuse-is not present when the fee is uniform. 
Thus, a uniform fee based on the costs of administering the permit 
system-not including the city's litigation expenses-and including 
an indigency provision, should be upheld. 
Some cities require permit applicants to have liability insurance 
for property damage or personal injuries that might occur as a result 
of the demonstration. Tort law on the problem of liability in the 
demonstration setting is unsettled,187 and the first amendment would 
seem to impose limits of its mm on the standard of liability,188 just as 
it has for the torts of invasion of privacy189 and defamation.190 With-
185. Of twenty-five cities responding to an inquiry on this point, four charge 
some fees: Cleveland ($1), Denver ($4), Los Angeles ($10), Oakland ($5). 
Personal correspondence on file with the author. 
186. See text accompanying note 183 supra. 
187. See Maxwell v. SCLC, 414 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1969); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 302A, 302B, 303 (1965). 
188. See Comment, Negligence and the First Amendment: A Note on the Destructive 
Assembly, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 391 (1970). 
189. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
190. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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out venturing into a prescriptive essay on this tangential subject, it is 
sufficient to note that innocent third parties often suffer financial 
and physical injury as a result of demonstrations, that the individual 
tortfeasors frequently cannot be identified or are judgment-proof, 
and that the municipality is seldom either liable or charitable.191 If 
the organizers of the demonstration may be held liable,192 why 
shouldn't precautions be taken to make sure that they are not 
judgment-proof? 
There are several difficulties with an insurance requirement. 
First, if the sponsors are so indigent that they are judgment-proof, 
they may be unable to afford the liability insurance premiums. Also, 
this type of insurance may be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain; would even Lloyd's insure the Weathermen? Even if insur-
ance companies were forced to write demonstration liability policies 
under an assigned-risk statute, the rates would undoubtedly be astro-
nomical,193 and the city could discriminate against unpopular groups 
by varying the size of the policy demanded.194 Moreover, peaceful 
groups would be forced to pay costly premiums not only because of 
the excesses of their own fringe members, but also indirectly because 
of the destructive forays of other groups with diametrically opposed 
views-a phenomenon that might even give these opposing groups 
an incentive to engage in violence. 
Furthermore, viable alternatives to required liability insurance 
exist. If the danger of violence is great, nonparticipants can board 
up their shops and absent themselves from the area of the demonstra-
tion. Victims of protest demonstrations often have, or are able to 
obtain, extended-coverage insurance protection195 at rates much 
lower than those charged to the victims of ghetto riots since the risk 
is not so geographically concentrated. In this regard, the Federal 
191. See Note, Municipal Liability for Riot Damage, 81 HARv. L. REv. 653 (1968); 
Comment, Municipal Liability for a Policy of Permitting Riot Damage, 47 TEXAS L. 
REv. 633 (1969). 
192. Organizers might be held liable, in spite of their first amendment privileges, if 
their reckless disregard of necessary safety precautions can be proved. Cf. New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
193. Conceivably the rates could be regulated, but if free assembly is to be 
subsidized it is difficult to see why private insurance companies rather than the govern-
ment should bear the burden. 
194. Protest groups at the 1968 Democratic National Convention were confronted 
with a $100,000-to-$300,000 insurance policy requirement, instituted for the occasion 
by Chicago city officials, as a condition for the issuance of a permit for a rally at Grant 
Park. D. WALKER, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 68 (1968). 
195. See Note, Riot Insurance, 77 YALE L.J. 541, 543-45 (1968); Note, Compensation 
for Yictims of Urban Riots, 68 CoLUM. L REv. 57, 59-65 (1968). 
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Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968196 may be 
of some assistance. Moreover, a number of state statutes hold munici-
palities strictly liable for riot damage.197 This approach has proved 
too expensive in cities which have suffered major ghetto uprisings,198 
but it would seem to be financially feasible if limited to planned 
demonstrations. On the other hand, each of these approaches has 
drawbacks. Strict municipal liability, for example, might cause extra 
resistance by city officials to the granting of permit requests and, at 
the same time, extra violence by protestors whose anger or economic 
coercion is directed at the city administration. The point is simply 
that from among the several possibilities available to a city for allo-
cating the cost of violence, any one that would force demonstrators as 
a class to bear the cost should be disallowed. This is so not because 
singling out a class of those who exercise their constitutional rights 
is improper per se-although it should be highly suspect-but be-
cause such a singling out can be enforced only by prepayment in 
the form of insurance premiums, and a prepayment requirement is 
certain significantly to discourage demonstrations and disproportion-
ately to burden poor protesters. 
This reasoning applies also to behavior and peace bonds.199 While 
these surety devices traditionally have been required only from indi-
viduals, they may be more effective in the group context, since fear 
of forfeiting the bond may make moderates unusually energetic 
and persuasive in their efforts to control their more aggressive com-
patriots. The more likely result, however, is that extremist groups 
may intentionally cause forfeitures in order to abort promising 
moderate movements. Even if it were stipulated that the antics of 
hecklers and lunatic-fringe elements would not result in forfeiture 
of the bond, the precise cause of violent outbursts is usually difficult 
to identify. It might also be argued that peace bonds would provide 
a great incentive for police riots. When these considerations are 
added to the usual drawbacks of prepayment-possible abuse in 
setting the amount, the special burden on poor groups, intense per-
sonal pressure on the wealthier members of a group once more to 
supply financial backing-the conclusion is compelling that any 
attempt to extend peace- and behavior-bond requirements into the 
realm of demonstration regulation should be struck down. 
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See Comment, Municipal Liability 
for a Policy of Permitting Riot Damage, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 633, 639 (1969). 
197. See Comment, supra note 196, at 635•36. 
198. Id. at 638. 
199. See generally Note, Peace and Behavior Bonds-Summary Punishment for 
Uncommitted Offenses, 52 VA. L. REv. 914 (1966). 
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I. Summary 
As a matter of constitutional law, municipalities should be able 
to prohibit demonstrations, either by permit denials or injunctions, 
only upon showing one of the following: (I) that more persons would 
be seriously inconvenienced by the event than would participate in 
it; (2) that the number of persons who would be less than seriously 
inconvenienced would be grossly disproportionate to the number of 
participants; (3) that the site, time, size, or duration of the proposed 
demonstration is prohibited by a uniformly enforced per se rule that 
is not unconstitutional in that a very high percentage of the demon-
strations covered by the rule would be prohibited under the con-
trolled-balancing standard; (4) that the applicants, after receiving a 
permit, have refused to inform the city of the general message or 
purpose of the proposed demonstration; (5) that a significant number 
of the demonstrators have a specific intent, manifested by specific 
plans, to engage in or provoke violence; (6) that a background of 
serious, recent, continuous, and widespread violence exists in the 
general location proposed for the demonstration; (7) that a fully 
enforced general curfew will be in existence at the time and place 
proposed for the demonstration; (8) that the applicants have failed 
to make a timely application for a permit, and could have done so 
since their demonstration was not in immediate response to an event 
of obvious importance; (9) that the applicants refuse to pay a small, 
uniform filing fee. 
Municipalities should not be held to a strict equal protection 
standard in allowing demonstrations; if city officials wish to give 
popular groups extraordinary demonstration privileges, similar treat-
ment for unpopular groups should not be a constitutional require-
ment, except in the case of a waiver of per se restrictions on size, 
time, place, and duration. The first amendment should be inter-
preted to prohibit the denial of a permit or the granting of an 
injunction simply because an alternative time or site for the demon-
stration would be preferable. As a matter of constitutional requisite, 
however, permit denials and injunctions should contain counter-
offers of alternative acceptable times and sites. 
Permit applicants should not be required to state the message 
or purpose of their demonstration in advance of the granting of the 
permit, but should be required to do so aftenvard. A permit never 
should be denied nor an injunction granted because violence is 
anticipated from hostile bystanders. The past conduct of the demon-
strators never should be considered in ruling upon permit applica-
tions or injunction requests. In addition, formal statements of 
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emergency, declarations of martial law, less-than-general curfews, and 
deployments of the National Guard should not affect the constitu-
tional calculus. With the exception of small, uniform filing fees, the 
right to demonstrate should never be conditioned on any sort of 
advance payment, either in the form of peace or behavior bonds, 
insurance requirements, or assessments for police and clean-up ex-
penses. A requirement of subsequent payment for police and clean-up 
services should be permissible; however, demonstration organizers, 
rather than being held personally liable for the amount, should be 
held only criminally liable for failing to exert a good faith effort to 
raise the amount from the participants. 
Each of the foregoing "shoulds" should be read into the first 
amendment and enforced as a constitutional principle. 
III. THE PROCEDURAL STANDARDS 
"[I]t is just as [the substantive] issues grow more difficult and 
divisive," Professor Paul Freund has observed, "that the procedural 
injustices about which there can be readier consensus tend to become 
grounds of decision."200 This phenomenon is already at work in the 
free speech area; one commentator has even proclaimed the existence 
of a distinct "first amendment due process."201 
Although the courts have largely ignored the procedural issues 
raised by prior restraints on demonstrations, the few judicial stirrings 
have all been promising. The majority opinion in Shuttlesworth v. 
City of Birmingham202 pointedly and gratuitously observed that the 
constitutionality of a permit scheme depends upon "among other 
things the availability of expeditious judicial review of the Com-
mission's refusal of a permit."203 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion 
also included a lengthy discussion of the need for expeditious pro-
cessing of applications.204 Both opinions stressed the relevance of 
Freedman v. Maryland,2°5 the case which initiated the constitutional 
requirement of expeditious review procedures for film censorship 
rulings. Also, a number of lower courts have applied the Freedman 
principles in the demonstrations context.206 If Freedman is consis-
200. P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 96-97 (1968). 
201. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 518, 518-20 
(1970). 
202. 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
203. 394 U.S. at 155 n.4. 
204. 394 U.S. at 161-64. 
205. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
206. See, e.g., Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 973 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Snyder 
v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of m., 286 F. Supp. 927, 936 (N.D. m. 1968); 
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tently so applied, and if its principles are read broadly, the forces of 
bureaucratic inefficiency and inertia will be realigned on the side of 
the protestors. That development would make the substantive re-
forms discussed in the preceding section seem like mere frosting on 
the cake. 
A. Freedman v. Maryland 
Although the substantive standards in Maryland's movie censor-
ship scheme were very likely unconstitutional ("tend ... to debase 
or corrupt morals or incite to crimes"207), Freedman's challenge 
to the Maryland law focused on the procedures of the prior restraint. 
Under those procedures, the exhibitor was required to submit all 
films before exhibition to the board of censors; no time limit for 
board action was set out; a film could be suppressed pendente lite 
for an indefinite period before any court had ruled upon it; judicial 
proceedings to review the censorship board's rulings had to be ini-
tiated by the exhibitor; and there was no fixed time limit for judicial 
disposition. Thus, in effect, a case could continue for months, with 
the film remaining under ·wraps all the while. 
The petitioner's decision to attack on the procedural flank turned 
out to be brilliant. The Supreme Court tossed one sop to the censors 
-the requirement that the exhibitor had the initial obligation to 
submit all films for inspection was held to entail no constitutional 
invalidity208-and then invalidated all other major features of the 
Maryland scheme.209 The Court then went on to prescribe the equi-
valent of a code of censorship procedure: (1) "the burden of proving 
that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor";210 
(2) "the exhibitor must be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial 
construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period, 
either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film";211 
(3) "[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determina-
tion on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the 
Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. i965). In addition, the 
commentators seem to be in agreement that the Freedman principles should apply to 
demonstration regulation. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV. 
L. REv. 518 (1970); Note, Parade Ordinances and Prior Restraints, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 
856 (1969); Note, Parades and Protest Demonstrations: Punctual Judicial Review of 
Prior Restraints on First Amendment Liberties, 45 IND. L.J. 114 (1969); The Supreme 
Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 145-46 (1967). 
207. Mo. ANN. CooE art. 66A, § 6 (1957), quoted at 380 U.S. at 52 n.2. 
208. 380 U.S. at 53-54. 
209. !l80 U.S. at 58-60. 
210. 380 U.S. at 58. 
211. 380 U.S. at 58-59. 
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status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judi-
cial resolution";212 (4) "the procedure must also assure a prompt final 
judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and 
possibly erroneous denial of a license."213 
The Maryland scheme was so far short of the mark that the actual 
application of the new constitutional principles in the case at hand 
added nothing in the way of refinement. Subsequent Supreme Court 
and lower court cases have, however, clarified the picture somewhat. 
The "specified brief period" for administrative action has been given 
a quantitative gloss: fifty-seven days is too long214 but twelve days plus 
an at-the-earliest-practicable-time step is permissible.215 Pendente 
lite restraints prior to the first judicial determination were approved 
in both Interstate Circuit Incorporated v. City of Dallas216 and 
Universal Film Exchanges Incorporated v. City of Chicago;217 in the 
former case the restraint could have lasted as long as nineteen 
days,218 in the latter, twenty-three days.219 In Interstate Circuit the 
"prompt final judicial decision" was interpreted to refer only to the 
trial court's ruling;220 apparently there is no constitutional require-
ment that appellate review be expedited. In Teitel Film Corpo-
ration v. Cusack,221 however, the Court held that it is not enough 
for a scheme to provide for a prompt trial court hearing; provision 
must also be made for a judicial decision within a specified brief 
period of time.222 In Interstate Circuit the Court held that the re-
quirement of a judicial decision within nine days after the admin-
istrative classification passed constitutional muster on that point.223 
B. The Freedman Principles Applied to Demonstrations 
The majority in Freedman added a word of caution for those who 
would apply its principles on prior-restraint procedure in other con-
texts: "The requirement of prior submission to a censor sustained 
in Times Film is consistent with our recognition that films differ 
212. 380 U.S. at 59. 
213. 380 U.S. at 59. 
214. Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968). 
215. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968). 
216. 390 U.S. 676 (1968). 
217. 288 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1968). 
218. 390 U.S. at 679. 
219. 288 F. Supp. at 289. 
220. 390 U.S. at 690 n.22. 
221. 390 U.S. 139 (1968). 
222. 390 U.S. at 142. 
223. 390 U.S. at 690 n.22. 
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from other forms of expression. Similarly, we think that the nature 
of the motion picture industry may suggest different time limits for 
a judicial determination."224 On the other hand, Justice Harlan 
suggested in his Shuttlesworth concurrence that the Freedman prin-
ciples should apply a fortiori in the demonstrations context: 
The right to assemble peaceably to voice political protest is at least 
as basic as the right to exhibit a motion picture which may have some 
aesthetic value. Moreover, slow-moving procedures have a much more 
severe impact in the instant case than they had in Freedman. Though 
a movie exhibitor might suffer some financial loss if he were obliged 
to wait for a year or two while the administrative and judicial mills 
ground out a result, it is nevertheless quite likely that the public 
would ultimately see the film. In contrast, timing is of the essence in 
politics. It is almost impossible to predict the political future; and 
when an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard 
promptly, if it is to be considered at all.225 
When a radical idea enlists the support of Justice Harlan, one is 
tempted to assume that surely its time has come. Nevertheless, a 
principle by which the Constitution begins to set docket priorities 
is not to be accepted lightly. A more detailed comparison of film 
censorship and demonstration regulation must precede any extension 
of the Freedman principles into the demonstration regulation area, 
especially since that comparison may vary depending on which aspect 
of the Freedman procedural code is at issue. 
1. The Burden of Proof 
Freedman placed "the burden of proving"226-presumably en-
compassing both the burden of going forward with evidence and the 
burden of persuasion-on the government because "the transcendant 
value of speech is involved"227 and also because "[p ]articularly in the 
case of motion pictures, it may take very little to deter exhibition in 
a given locality."228 In assigning the burden of proof, the Court was 
especially worried about the danger of self-censorship: "The ex-
hibitor's stake in any one picture may be insufficient to warrant a 
protracted and onerous course of litigation. The distributor, on the 
other hand, may be equally unwilling to accept the burdens and 
delays of litigation in a particular area when, without such difficulties, 
he can freely exhibit his film in most of the rest of the country .... "220 
224. 380 U.S. at 60-61. 
225. 394 U.S. at 162-63. 
226. 380 U.S. at 58. 
227. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958), quoted at 380 U.S. at 58. 
228. 380 U.S. at 59. 
229. 380 U.S. at 59. 
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Neither the "transcendant value" nor the self-censorship ratio-
nale would seem to apply with much force in the context of demon-
stration regulation. The former appears to be an application of the 
familiar policy of 11:andicapping disfavored contentions in assigning 
the burden of proo£:2ao Not all speech regulation contentions should 
be formally disfavored, however. It is one thing to say that the regu-
latory interest in film censorship should be handicapped because it 
is dubious, amorphous, and quite possibly irrational, or to say that 
the regulatory interest in denying tax exemptions to alleged subver-
sives should be burdened for similar reasons.231 It is quite a different 
matter to burden the regulatory interest when it is concrete and 
undeniable, as in the case of demonstrations, and when prevailing 
substantive doctrine-the controlled balance-has already attempted 
to reflect the transcendant value of speech. 
The self-censorship rationale would also seem to be inapplicable 
in the demonstration regulation context. There is little reason to 
believe that "it may take very little to deter [demonstrations] in a 
given locality."232 Demonstrators probably do not, as a rule, compute 
marginal cost before pursuing their legal remedies. Perhaps some 
groups are deterred by an unwillingness or inability to pay for legal 
representation, by general paranoia about the court system, or by 
inertia; but constraints of that sort are not affected by shifting the 
burden of proof. 
In the absence of any doctrinal help from the Freedman opinion, 
the problem of assigning the burden of going forward and the burden 
of persuasion can be solved by resort to two traditional principles: 
(I) both burdens should be placed on the party who has superior 
access to the relevant evidence;233 (2) a party should not be required 
to prove a negative.234 Under the substantive standards detailed 
above,235 four issues of fact are likely to recur in disputes over 
demonstration regulation: (1) the number of people who will be 
seriously inconvenienced; (2) the number of people expected to par-
ticipate in the demonstration; (3) whether a significant number of 
those expected to participate have a specific intent to engage in, or 
to provoke, violence; (4) whether a sufficient background of violence 
230. C. McCO1tMICK, EVIDENCE § 318, at 674 (1954). 
231. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
232. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). 
233. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 318, at 675 (1954). 
234. Id. 
235. See pts. II. A.-F. supra. 
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exists to justify prohibiting all demonstrations for the time being. 
On the first and fourth issues, the city should have the burden of 
proof because of its superior access to the relevant evidence. For the 
same reason, the demonstrators should have the burden on the 
second issue. On the other hand, the city should have the burden on 
the third issue-specific intent-because othenvise the demonstrators 
would be required to prove a negative, always a difficult task, but 
one bordering on the impossible in the realm of intent. While these 
assignments of the burden of proof follow traditional common-law 
principles, they should be considered constitutional requirements: 
the fact that the first amendment may not require more than the 
common law does should not mean that it cannot forbid eccentric 
state schemes that attempt to provide less. 
2. The Deadline for Administrative Action 
The censorship scheme in Maryland which led to the develop-
ment of the Freedman principles provided for an administrative 
evaluation of all films by a board of censors. Similar provisions for 
administrative determination of demonstration permit requests are 
also possible, although, as will be discussed below,236 they may not be 
constitutionally required. Whether the administrative decision is 
made pursuant to formal or informal procedures, it is necessary to 
determine whether the Freedman requirement of the "specified brief 
period" for administrative action231 should apply to the regulation 
of demonstrations. 
In deciding this question, it is first necessary to ask whether the 
principle of a definite time deadline would be desirable in the demon-
stration permit context and then whether the maximum permissible 
time lag between the filing of the permit application and final 
administrative action should be the same for demonstrations as it is 
for films. 
In some respects, a definite deadline for administrative action 
would seem to be even more important for demonstration regulation 
than for film censorship. In his Shuttlesworth concurrence, Justice 
Harlan rejected the notion that the Freedman administrative dead-
line can be traced in any sense to the unique importance of the 
motion picture as a mode of expression; he found the demonstration 
"at least as basic" in terms of first amendment values.238 Justice 
Harlan also pointed out that timing tends to be more important for 
236, See text accompanying notes 273-82 infra. 
237, 380 U.S. at 59, 
238. 394 U.S. at 162, 
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political speech than for artistic expression, since political ideas are 
more often of a topical nature.239 While the demonstration is be-
coming an art form in its own right, and while political films are not 
unknown, it is probably a fair generalization to treat demonstrations 
as political, and thus especially dependent upon timing. Even apart 
from the factor of topicality, the showing of films can frequently be 
delayed indefinitely without in any way affecting their content, 
whereas delay can often seriously undermine a demonstration-even 
one with an eternal message-since the participatory enthusiasm on 
which it is based may wane rapidly or be diverted into other channels. 
Timing is relevant in still another respect in that both films and 
demonstrations are dependent to some extent on promotional activ-
ities. Unlike the amateur advertising usually associated with demon-
strations, however, film promotion is more often institutionalized 
and durable-the coming attractions, the radio spots, and the posters 
can all be saved and used at a later date. Also, films are such that they 
need not always be advertised contemporaneously with their exhibi-
tion: since the advertising relates to a product that will be available 
to the consumer over a period of time, the effect may linger in the 
consumer's subconscious for months. Demonstration advertising, on 
the other hand, must of necessity be informational rather than sub-
liminal, and is, accordingly, much more dependent on close temporal 
proximity to the event. All of these considerations add up to a more 
elaborate explication of Justice Harlan's basic proposition that inso-
far as the importance of timing for the particular speech activity is 
determinative, the Freedman requirement of an administrative dead-
line should apply a fortiori in the context of mass demonstrations.240 
Another factor mentioned in Freedman was the probability of 
passive acceptance of incorrect censorship rulings-a problem par-
ticularly acute in the motion picture context in light of the almost 
exclusively financial motivations of exhibitors and distributors,241 
and the absence of any power in the hands of the viewing public to 
initiate litigation on the subject. Certainly there is less danger of this 
type of calculated cop-out in disputes over demonstration permits, 
since protestors are likely to be more ideological than movie exhibi-
tors and, for that matter, more stubborn. On the other hand, the fact 
that most demonstrations are so dependent on timing often produces 
the same result as passive acceptance, since an administrative "pocket 
239. 394 U.S. at 162-63. 
240. Justice Harlan stated, "The Freedman principle is applicable here." 394 U.S. 
at 162. 
241. See text accompanying note 229 supra. 
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veto" or an eleventh-hour rejection which leaves no time for judicial 
review can likewise result in the effective disallowance of speech that 
should be protected under the prevailing substantive standards. Also, 
considering the institutional legal resources of the film industry and 
the promotional advantages that protracted, controversial litigation 
can sometimes entail, it is by no means clear that the forces of regu-
latory inefficiency and inertia have the potential to cause more of a 
chilling effect on films than on demonstrations. Thus, insofar as 
Freedman's administrative deadline can be traced to a concern over 
this chilling effect phenomenon, it would seem to apply also in the 
context of demonstration regulation. 
An additional dimension to the administrative deadline issue, not 
mentioned either in Freedman or in Justice Harlan's concurrence 
in Shuttlesworth, is the social cost of an incorrect rejection of a 
permit request. In the case of motion pictures, the cost can be cal-
culated entirely in terms of the speech value lost thereby. Except 
perhaps in the case of "underground" exhibitors, defiance of censor-
ship rulings is most improbable,242 and even when such defiance 
occurs it is no more disruptive or costly than an approved showing. 
When a demonstration is incorrectly (in terms of the prevailing sub-
stantive standards) prohibited, on the other hand, the cost is likely to 
be quite high: loss of the message, further political alienation of the 
demonstrators, and, most important, a squandered opportunity for 
planning and cooperation in the event that the applicants decide to 
demonstrate anyway. Furthermore, outright defiance of prohibitions 
on demonstrations is not an uncommon phenomenon; and the out-
come can be bloody. When the permit rejection is correct on the 
merits, such confrontations can be blamed on the demonstrators, and 
can be considered unavoidable if the rule of law is to be maintained. 
When the prohibition is incorrect, however, in terms of the prevail-
ing substantive standards, the violence and the destruction-not to 
mention the political polarization-must be considered a cost that, in 
many instances, could have been avoided by streamlined procedures 
-including an administrative deadline. It is this factor of the social 
cost of procedural sloth that most clearly distinguishes film censor-
ship from demonstration regulation, and most imperatively requires 
the application of the Freedman administrative deadline a fortiori 
in the latter context. 
In searching for distinctions that might justify a refusal to extend 
242. This is true especially in view of the city's plentiful retaliatory resources: 
building inspections, tax assessments, zoning restrictions, parking regulations, and the 
like, 
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the Freedman administrative deadline to demonstrations, an argu-
ment can be made emphasizing the relative importance of bargaining 
in the two regulatory situations. Films can be spliced, but only at 
a sacrifice in artistic integrity; negotiation and bargaining are not 
regular features of the film censorship process. On the other hand, 
major demonstrations are often preceded by weeks of negotiating and 
compromising over routes, schedules, and even the amenities of 
arrest.243 It can be argued that a fixed deadline for administrative 
action may operate not unlike compulsory arbitration in that it may 
sap the incentive from both sides to seek earnestly a collective-
bargaining solution. If city officials are denied the opportunity for 
extended negotiations, they may well adopt a policy to reject all 
controversial requests, thereby transferring the whole problem to the 
courts. Even if the courts should eventually rule for the demonstra-
tors, an atmosphere of hostility may have been created in place of the 
cooperation and mutual planning that might have reigned had there 
been more time for bargaining. 
This line of reasoning should be rejected, however, for two 
reasons. First, a deadline for administrative action need not foreclose 
negotiations. The parties can still bargain against the deadline for 
court action-hardly a strange phenomenon in civil litigation. One 
might even surmise that, at present, a major barrier to effective bar-
gaining is the hope on the part of city officials that they may be able 
to escape with a pocket veto. Second, and more important, even if 
the deadline for administrative action is thought to hinder rather 
than help the bargaining process, it is by no means clear that the 
right to demonstrate should be defined by tests of will and strength. 
To encourage bargaining is to encourage the parties to cultivate 
their respective bargaining cards. For permit applicants-at least 
those without significant political power-the ace in the hole at the 
bargaining table is their relative ability and willingness to cause 
violence if the permit is not granted, either directly or by provoking 
a police reaction; for the city, on the other hand, the ace in the hole 
is the willingness to make life extremely unpleasant for those who 
demonstrate without a permit. A process that rewards these types of 
skills and attitudes should be viewed with some alarm. Also, bargain-
ing should not be preferred merely on the basis of its greater flexibility, 
since imaginative use of equitable remedies such as the injunction 
can more than adequately close the flexibility gap. 
The conclusion seems inescapable, then, that a definite deadline 
243. See, e.g., D. WALKER, RIGHTS IN CoNFLic-r 59-94 (1968); N. MAILER, THE 
ARMIES OF THE NIGHT 236-43 (1968). 
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for final administrative action should be a constitutional requirement 
for prior restraints on demonstrations. The remaining issue is what 
exactly should be the maximum permissible time lag between the 
application date and final administrative disposition. It may be that 
because of the complexity of the evidence relevant to the issue of 
competing public uses, the time limit for demonstration regulation 
should be longer than that for film censorship. However, the Dallas 
film censorship procedure approved in the Interstate Circuit dictum 
permitted a maximum time lag of twelve days with an at-the-earliest-
practicable-time provision;244 and there is nothing in the opinion to 
indicate that an even longer maximum time lag might not be 
approved. One week should be a sufficient period for administrative 
action on demonstration permit requests, especially if the administra-
tive decision is entrusted to a regular government department, rather 
than, as is generally the case with film censorship, a special panel of 
private citizens who can meet only at a mutually convenient time. 
The extreme importance of timing245 and the high social cost of delay 
in the demonstration context246 are additional considerations which 
support the conclusion that any prior-restraint scheme that allows 
a maximum time lag of more than one week between the application 
date and the final administrative disposition should be found to be 
unconstitutional. 
Moreover, even a one-week deadline would be inadequate for 
what is probably a sizable percentage of the permit applications-
those filed less than a week before the proposed date for the event. 
It can be argued that no special adjustment should be made for these 
requests-that the threat of a pocket veto provides applicants with 
a healthy incentive to file early . .As mentioned earlier,247 however, 
many demonstrations are in direct response to rapidly developing 
political events, and it is precisely this species of protest that carries 
a high risk of spontaneous combustion if some semblance of coopera-
tion with city officials is not established. A sensible principle to follow 
for such cases would be to insist that the applicants have at least one 
opportunity for judicial relief and that, accordingly, final administra-
tive disposition must occur no later than ttventy-four hours before 
the scheduled event.248 
244-. 390 U.S. at 679. 
245. See text accompanying notes 225 &: 239 supra. 
246. See text accompanying note 242 supra. 
247. See text accompanying note 225 supra. 
248. Coupled with the permissible forty-eight-hour advance-filing requirement (see 
text accompanying notes 169-70 supra), this would always give the city at least twenty-
four hours to make its administrative decision. 
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3. The Burden of Initiating Judicial Proceedings 
A casual reader of the Freedman opinion might overlook what 
is probably the most important of its procedural reforms: the require-
ment that city officials act not only promptly, but also affirmatively. 
Outright denial of a license no longer suffices; the city must "either 
issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film."249 Thus, 
in effect, Freedman demands that the supposed benefits of censorship 
be balanced against not only the speech value of the film, but also 
against the value of the city attorney's time and energy-a concrete 
consideration that may commend itself to bureaucrats who could 
never be made to genuflect before "the market place of ideas." While 
this drain on city hall legal resources would have to be considered 
even if the burden of initiative were reversed and the city were forced 
to contemplate only a defensive posture in litigation if it rejected 
the application, affirmatively placing the obligation to sue on the 
city may make a difference, for three reasons: (1) the responsibility 
to take affirmative action may force city officials to do some hard 
thinking about priorities-thinking that would seldom germinate in 
normal bureaucratic routine; (2) offensive litigation may be more 
burdensome than defensive litigation (it takes more time and 
thought to draft a complaint than a general denial); and (3) the city 
attorney's office, which is likely to be more informed about-and 
probably more sympathetic to-first amendment rights, will make 
the final administrative decision rather than the censorship board.2~0 
Once more, these policies would seem to carry over into the area 
of demonstration regulation. A fortiori arguments can again be 
made: (1) since there is a potential for violence in demonstrations, 
city officials, fearful of being held responsible for their decisions, are 
probably even more cautious in granting permits than are film 
censorship boards-thus there is a need for a requirement of affirma-
tive action to counterbalance this inclination; (2) demonstrators are 
less likely than film exhibitors to have retained counsel who are 
familiar with the permit procedures-thus it may not be fair to put 
the burden of initiating court action on them. Also, in light of the 
fact that the city attorney should be familiar with the permit pro-
cedures and should have greater access to evidence than the demon-
strators, he should be in a better position to assess whether litigation 
is likely to be worth the effort. Thus, the burden of initiating judicial 
proceedings in disputes over demonstration permits should be placed 
249. 380 U.S. at 59. 
250. Or in the case of demonstrations, the decision would be made by the parks 
department or the police department. 
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on the municipal government. This should be so even when the 
application is submitted less than a week in advance, so that the 
controlling deadline for completion of administrative action is, as 
discussed above,251 twenty-four hours before the event. Then, more 
than ever, the city's greater familiarity with the requisite procedures 
makes it the proper party to initiate judicial activity. 
4. The Deadline for Judicial Action 
The conclusion that a permit scheme must set a deadline for 
administrative action does not necessarily resolve the companion 
problem of whether there must be a deadline for judicial action. It 
is one thing to require the police chief or the park commissioner to 
grant or deny a permit request within a week; it is quite another to 
force a state court to schedule a hearing, postpone other pending 
cases, hear hastily assembled evidence and hastily prepared argument, 
deliberate, and render a principled decision, all against a rigid dead-
line. 
Fortunately, the problem may not be so serious as would appear 
at first. Preference statutes252 and court rules253 in many states already 
provide some protection against delay. Also, if the burden to seek 
judicial validation of the permit denial is placed on the city, that 
burden could be interpreted to mean that the city's failure to achieve 
such validation by the time of the scheduled demonstration would 
preclude a conviction for parading without a permit. Such a scheme, 
which places the penalty for court delay on the city, would probably 
lead to the innovative utilization by state judges of the docket-
preference concept. 
In Freedman, it will be remembered, the Court exhibited no such 
faith in these alternative solutions to the problem of delay. It held 
that a film censorship scheme must set out a fixed deadline for "final 
judicial decision,"254 a requirement which it later interpreted to 
apply only to the trial court stage,255 and to be satisfied by a nine-day 
time lag between the administrative decision and the trial court 
251. See text following note 247 supra. 
252. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 527, 660, 1062a (West 1957). The state 
statutes are collected in Note, Trial Calendar Advancement, 6 STAN. L. REv. 323, app. 
II (1954). 
253. See, e.g., N.Y.R. CIV. PRAc. 5521 (McKinney 1963), discussed in 7 J. WEINSTEIN, 
H. KORN &: A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE §§ 5521.01-.02 (1964). See also 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19, 25 (N.D. Tex. 1965). 
254. !l80 U.S. at 59. 
255. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 n.22 (1968). See 
text accompanying note 220 supra. 
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ruling.256 One justification for the innovative Freedman holding may 
be that the pressures for early determination that typically operate 
in the demonstration context cannot be relied upon in film censor-
ship cases. In film litigation, there is seldom a critical target date in 
advance of which a judge will want to rule, whereas in demonstration 
cases a judge will often set such a date either out of fairness or out 
of fear that unreviewed administrative recalcitrance will breed de-
fiance. There is less incentive for judicial efficiency in the film con-
text also because defiance of film censorship board rulings is neither 
so likely nor so disruptive as its counterpart in the demonstrations 
context. The profit-maximizing exhibitor's willingness to tolerate 
only so much delay before abandoning the interests of his viewing 
public may further explain the Court's great attentiveness in Freed-
man to the problem of judicial delay, without compelling a similar 
concern in demonstration cases. A final consideration may be the 
relative potential for abuse of the procedural reform in the two 
situations. Alienated demonstrators bent on "counter-harassment" 
tactics could have a field day with the expedited procedures, since it 
takes little effort to propose a demonstration and demand a permit; 
the price of admission to the Freedman film censorship procedures is 
a good deal higher: possession of a controversial film and a place to 
show it. 
Nevertheless, despite the distinctions and dangers outlined above, 
the Freedman requirement of expedited judicial review should be 
extended to disputes concerning demonstration permits. Although 
there is some incentive, as detailed above,257 for a judge to decide a 
case before a target date, a pass-the-buck mentality probably operates 
on too many occasions, especially those involving docile demonstra-
tors. Here again, there is little to be said for a policy that encourages 
the cultivation of disruption potential. Furthermore, even if a judge is 
pressured into ruling before a target date, a fixed deadline can, de-
pending upon the degree of cooperation evinced by the demonstra-
tors in submitting early applications, move up the date of decision 
far enough to facilitate suitable planning by both the city and the 
demonstrators. While the judge may also take this factor into con-
sideration, he may not feel sufficient pressure to hasten his decision. 
In any event, the demonstrators should know best how much advance 
preparation is desirable and should, accordingly, have the option to 
provide for that appropriate time increment after the final judicial 
256. 390 U.S. at 690 n.22. See text accompanying note 223 supra. 
257. See text accompanying notes 252-53 supra. 
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decision by submitting their permit requests a calculable period of 
time in advance. 
Perhaps the best reason for a fixed deadline for trial court action 
is that in a large number of cases it may be the only way to make 
appellate review feasible. The local trial court judge is a member of 
the community; often he is elected. A distant, multimember appel-
late panel will generally stand a much better chance of resisting the 
local pressures that frequently accompany demonstration requests 
made by unpopular groups. If there is no deadline for judicial action 
and if the trial judge is hostile to the demonstrators' cause, he can 
preclude the possibility of appellate review by delaying his decision 
until the very eve of the scheduled event. While a deadline for judi-
cial action would not totally solve this problem-in most instances 
the appellate tribunal would still have to be willing to advance the 
case on its own docket-at least it would prevent a hostile trial judge 
from blocking the path to a more sympathetic tribunal. 
Furthermore, if trial court hostility (or at least constitutional 
myopia) is in fact a serious problem, perhaps there is a need to re-
examine the Interstate Circuit dictum which states that Freedman's 
"prompt final decision" refers only to the trial court ruling.258 On 
the other hand, expedited appellate review can mean burdensome 
travel arrangements and the shuffling of precious docket resources. 
It can also be argued that the process of expedition must end some-
where, and that one "day in court" would seem to be an adequate 
allowance for those seeking preferred treatment. Moreover, the need 
for unhurried deliberation, for "neutral principles," and for judicial 
"craftsmanship," might be said to be stronger at the appellate level. 
The spectre of a systematic harassment of the court system by would-
be demonstrators might also be raised-this time with a more 
compelling parade of horrors. Furthermore, a discretionary docket-
advancement provision in the appellate court rules, such as existed 
in Shuttlesworth,259 may be a sufficient vehicle for expedited appel-
late review: if the trial court denial is truly arbitrary and if the ap-
pellate court is truly sympathetic, the docket advancement can be 
achieved without a deadline on appellate review; compulsory expe-
dited review is likely to accomplish little more and is sure to breed 
resentment among appellate judges. While the danger of trial court 
inadequacy is not to be underestimated, these competing consider-
ations should prevail: the statement in Interstate Circuit that the ex-
258. 390 U.S. at 690 n.22. See text accompanying note 220 supra. 
259. Au. CODE, tit. 7 app., SOP. CT. R. 47 (1960), cited in Walker v. City of lfaming-
ham, 388 U.S. 307, 319 (1967). 
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peditious-review requirement applies only to the trial court ruling 
should govern as well for the regulation of demonstrations, subject 
to the caveat that the scheme must include a provision for discretion-
ary docket advancement at the appellate court level. 
On the question of the maximum permissible time lag between 
the filing by the city of the suit for validation of a permit denial and 
the trial court decision on that question, the nine days approved in 
Interstate Circuit would seem to be too long. Since demonstrations 
are so frequently keyed to a specific target date, and since the vio-
lence-potential element makes it imperative that the legal system be 
promptly responsive to permit requests, the maximum permissible 
time period for judicial action should be one week. When coupled 
with the one-week time period for administrative action, that leaves 
a time span of as much as two weeks between the filing of the permit 
application and the trial court decision-a length of time already 
bordering on the unrealistic for demonstrators operating in a tur-
bulent political world. 
Two other problems regarding the deadline for judicial action 
are worthy of mention. First, what happens when the application is 
filed so late as to make the one-week judicial deadline irrelevant?260 
If, for example, an application is submitted three days before the 
event and the city sues to validate a denial twenty-four hours before 
the time scheduled for the demonstration, must the statutory scheme 
require the trial court to reach a decision within the remaining 
twenty-four hours? Or, if the application is filed thirteen days in 
advance of the proposed event, and the city goes to court, as re-
quired, with six days remaining, can the trial judge simply let the 
target date pass without doing anything? As was true for the admin-
istrative deadline, a refusal to provide special treatment in these 
time-pressure cases can be defended as creating an incentive for early 
planning and filing-assuming that the risk of judicial inaction is to 
be borne by the demonstrators.261 That incentive, plus the interest 
in a relatively orderly functioning of the courts, must be weighed 
against the benefits that might accrue in having a special judicial 
deadline for time-pressure cases. Those advantages, however, are 
few: the likelihood is de minimis that an emergency trial court 
deadline would make appellate review feasible; in any event there 
would not be enough time after the final decision for careful, de-
tailed planning;262 and a trial judge who would use a "pocket veto" 
260. See text accompanying note 251 supra. 
261. See text accompanying note 257 supra. 
262. The opportunity for such planning provided one rationale that supported 
the standard judicial deadline. 
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in the absence of a special deadline is unlikely to rule for the dem-
onstrators, especially if the time pressure is such that he is not fearful 
of appellate review. Accordingly, when time is so short that the one-
week judicial deadline would be inapplicable, there should be no 
first amendment requirement that an emergency deadline for judi-
cial review be instituted. 
The remaining constitutional problem concerns a possible alter-
native system of administrative and judicial deadlines keyed not to the 
number of days after filing, but rather to the number of days before 
the scheduled event. Thus, a permit ordinance might provide that, 
no matter how early the protesters apply, the final administrative 
decision must come at least two weeks before the proposed date for the 
demonstration, and the final trial court decision must come, for ex-
ample, four days before that date. Such a scheme should not satisfy the 
requirements of the first amendment. Some protest groups may feel 
that it is very important to get a trial court decision on their appli-
cation several weeks before the proposed event in order to make fea-
sible elaborate planning or promotional activities, or to leave enough 
time for unhurried appellate litigation. Courts should of course up-
hold reasonable advance-filing maximums in order to guard against 
unseemly squatters' contests for scarce or distinctive sites and times; 
but within the rather lengthy time periods remaining after that con-
sideration is taken into account, applicants should be entitled to ad-
vance through the administrative and trial court stages in two weeks, 
and to proceed with detailed planning or appellate litigation, as the 
case maybe. 
Thus, a thorough comparison of film censorship and demonstra-
tion regulation serves to substantiate the preliminary observations 
made in Shuttlesworth that prior restraints on demonstrations should 
be governed by the principles of Freedman v. Maryland. A final argu-
ment against the extension of Freedman might center on the Court's 
failure in that case, and in Shuttlesworth. to consider the existing 
alternative of injunctive relief in the federal courts under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.263 What justification, it may be asked, can there be for a 
novel and intricate intrusion by the first amendment into the tran-
quil domain of state court procedures when the rights of assembly 
are in no way dependent on those procedures? The justification 
263. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
Laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
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might lie in the several potential obstacles to federal relief: the fed-
eral district judge may insist on an exhaustion of local administrative 
remedies, even in the absence of an administrative deadline and in 
the face of official delay; he may abstain; or he may sit hundreds of 
miles away. In any event, the federal alternative places the burden of 
initiating judicial proceedings on the demonstrators, and, as ex-
plained above,264 the shifting of that burden is probably the most 
significant of the Freedman principles. Accordingly, the contention 
should not be accepted that the Freedman reforms are unnecessary in 
light of the existing federal remedies. The Supreme Court should 
fulfill the promise of Shuttlesworth and insist that prior restraints 
on demonstrations satisfy the procedural requirements outlined in 
Freedman v. Maryland. 
C. Appellate Review of Fact-Finding 
The Court in Freedman did not presume to answer all procedural 
questions which may arise in the prior-restraint context. One impor-
tant procedural aspect with which Freedman did not deal is appellate 
review of fact-finding. 
It is a common practice in several kinds of first amendment cases 
-libel,265 obscenity,266 contempt of court by publication,267 unlawful 
advocacy268-for the Supreme Court to undertake an independent 
examination of the record and to reach its mm factual conclusions. 
Edwards v. South Carolina269 and Cox v. Louisiana270 established the 
propriety of appellate fact-finding in mass assembly cases: "In the 
area of First Amendment freedoms as well as areas involving other 
constitutionally protected rights, 'we cannot avoid our responsibil-
ities by permitting ourselves to be "completely bound by state court 
determination of any issue essential to decision of a claim of federal 
right .... "' "271 The majority opinions in Edwards and Cox contain 
generous excerpts from the trial transcripts, but in neither case did 
the Court specifically overturn a formal lower court finding on an 
264. See text accompanying notes 249-51 supra. 
265. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). 
266. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-90 (1964). 
267. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946). 
268. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927). 
269. 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). 
270. 379 U.S. 536, 545 n.8 (1965). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
271. Haynes v, Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-16 (1963), quoted at 379 U.S. at 
545 n.8. 
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issue of primary fact. Furthermore, the Court's disclaimer related 
only to being "completely bound." 
In attempting to prevent extension of the practice of appellate 
fact-finding to disputes concerning demonstration permit denials and 
injunctions, it might be argued that since factual disputes are likely 
to be complicated and time pressures are likely to be great, appellate 
fact-finding is an empirical luxury that the judicial system simply 
cannot afford. It might also be contended that Edwards and Cox 
were wrongly decided on this point in the first place. Furthermore, 
it might be argued that the analogy to other free speech cases is 
faulty because trial court expertise can be important in resolving the 
factual disputes which arise out of demonstrations, whereas an ap-
pellate court is likely to be just as good as a trial court at reading 
incendiary pamphlets and scandal sheets and watching dirty movies. 
A number of additional considerations suggest, however, that the 
practice of appellate fact-finding in mass assembly cases is both desir-
able and applicable a fortiori in the prior-restraint context. The com-
plexity of the factual determinations in mass-assembly cases makes 
appellate review especially important, since the temptation must be 
great for a trial judge-especially one working under enormous time 
pressures-to defer excessively to the judgment of the city's "ex-
perts."272 The municipal judge may be under additional pressure 
when those experts are likely to construe a rejection of their special-
ized judgment as an insult to their competence or integrity; munic-
ipal harmony may thus be a hidden issue. The complexity of the 
competing-use determination and the impossibility of resolving it 
by per se rules also make it desirable for the trial judge to be as 
articulate and specific as possible in setting out his factual con-
clusions; nothing is likely to encourage this specificity as much as the 
threat of appellate reversal. 
Moreover, permit denials and injunctions are prior restraints and, 
as such, the "facts" are not actual events, but merely estimates. The 
danger that the subjective values of the decision-maker will color the 
fact-finding process is especially great; thus, the need for an appellate 
check is unusually strong. Also, because the crucial disputes will con-
cern estimates by competing "experts," the demeanor and credibil-
ity of the witnesses will not be so important as their qualifications, 
their logic, and their proof; thus, the "dry record" will be a more 
adequate basis for appellate review than is usually the case. Finally, 
and probably most important, fact-finding before the event places 
272, See text following note 281 infra, and text accompanying notes 282-84 infra. 
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enormous pressures on the decision-maker to err on the side of 
regulation, since he is likely to be blamed if the demonstration is 
approved and subsequently turns out to be more inconvenient or de-
structive than expected. Appellate fact-finding may suffer less from 
this cautionary bias. 
These pressures of complexity, subjectivity, and fear of blame 
operate on appellate judges as well, but it is probably a fair general-
ization to say that their relative remoteness from local political pres-
sures, their collective decision-making processes, and their somewhat 
more detached perspectives are likely to produce better results in 
enough cases to justify the added litigation costs of appellate fact-
:finding. Lest it be thought, however, that those same institutional 
qualities may lead to unrealistic, "academic" judgments, it is also 
safe to predict that appellate courts will still pay great deference to 
lower court :findings and will exercise their fact-finding powers only 
in extreme cases. 
D. The Requirement of an Administrative Hearing 
There is another important procedural question with which 
Freedman did not deal. As mentioned previously,273 the prior-re-
straint scheme in Freedman provided for an administrative hearing, 
so the Court was not forced in that case to decide whether such a 
formal hearing is constitutionally required. The issue is important 
because few demonstration permit systems provide for a formal ad-
ministrative hearing. 
In upholding the permit scheme in Cox v. New Hampshire,274. 
the Supreme Court emphasized the procedural protections afforded 
applicants at the administrative stage: "uniformity of method of 
treatment upon the facts of each application";275 a "systematic, con-
sistent and just order of treatment";276 and "a required investi-
gation."277 The Court has held that the Constitution requires admin-
istrative hearings of some sort (not necessarily "trial-type") in bar 
admission278 and welfare termination disputes;279 lower courts have 
273. See text following note 207 supra. 
274. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
275. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 143, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940), quoted at ~12 U.S. at 
576. 
276. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 143, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940), quoted at 312 U.S. at 576. 
277. State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 146, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940), quoted at 312 
U.S. at 576. 
278. Willner v. Committee on Character 8: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). 
279. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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applied the requirement to college disciplinary actions.280 While the 
general principle is that de novo judicial review (as would exist for 
demonstration permit disputes under the procedures advocated 
above) precludes any due process objection to administrative pro-
ceedings,281 it can be argued that "first amendment due process" (the 
"preferred procedural position") should not be so easily satisfied-
that permit applicants should be constitutionally entitled to a full 
and fair hearing at each and every stage of the proceedings. 
Several policy considerations might be marshalled in support of 
such a contention. First, it can be argued that a hearing, because it 
brings the factual issues more rapidly into focus, is likely to improve 
the chances that the city will grant the permit without a court fight 
-assuming, as seems plausible, that without a hearing the city will 
generally resolve factual uncertainties in favor of rejecting the ap-
plication. If a permit is to be issued eventually, it is preferable that 
the granting of the permit be done voluntarily by city officials in the 
first instance-not only because this saves time, judicial resources, 
and litigation expenses, but also because such official cooperation is 
likely to increase community tolerance, and to facilitate communi-
cation and planning between protestors and city officials. Moreover, 
the time element is important to impartial decision-making is an-
other respect: even though, as a rule, judges are more likely than 
bureaucrats to recognize legitimate speech interests, this may not be 
true when the bureaucrat has a week to explore the situation and the 
judge has only twenty-four hours or less. Also, as Professor Davis has 
argued, de novo judicial review may be a false muse "when the court 
is strongly influenced by the agency's view, or when despite the theo-
retical scope of review the court limits its inquiry to reasonable-
ness. "282 Furthermore, even if the administrative hearing does not 
result in a permit being voluntarily granted, it may substantially 
improve any subsequent judicial proceedings, especially if time pres-
sure is great at the latter stage: the litigants will have already amassed 
their evidence; they will be much better informed about each others' 
contentions; and an administrative record, or at least administrative 
findings, will be available to the judge so he can focus his inquiry on 
the key points of dispute. 
There are some respects, however, in which an administrative 
280. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Soglin v. 
Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), a/fd., 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). 
See generally Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L REY. 1027 (1969). 
281. l K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.10 (1958). 
282. Id. § 7,10, at 451. 
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hearing may work to the detriment of the speech interest-a hap-
penstance that does not necessarily cast aspersions on the desirability 
of such a hearing, but which certainly undercuts the argument that 
it is required as a matter of "first amendment due process." First, 
there is reason to believe that city officials will be more accommodat-
ing to unpopular groups when the decisions of those officials are at 
a level of "low visibility"-that is, when their affirmation of first 
amendment rights need not be held up to the glaring light of voter 
backlash, or when there is less opportunity for them to grandstand in 
rejecting the filthy traitors. Second, even if the one-week administra-
tive deadline would be feasible, a hearing requirement would cause 
some needless delays within that period, particularly in those in-
stances in which the city officials have firmly decided not to grant the 
permit. There is nothing magic about a one-week time period; if a 
hopelessly deadlocked dispute can be shifted to the courts in two days, 
all the better. Third, the more the administrative determination re-
sembles a court proceeding, the more judges may be tempted to defer 
to the administrative judgment, albeit informally or subconsciously. 
The above considerations serve only to devalue the pro-speech 
side of the issue. On the pro-regulatory side must be included the 
time drain on busy city officials, the scheduling and procedure-form-
ulating headaches, and the potential for "counter-harassment." On 
the whole, it would seem that the desirability of a hearing is a matter 
of sufficient ambivalence that the first amendment, as procedurally 
sensitized as it ought to be, should adopt a stance of benign neglect 
toward the question. 
If, however, a city should provide for a comprehensive adminis-
trative hearing, de novo judicial review of such a hearing should be 
a constitutional requirement. Whether or not the ghost of Crowell v. 
Benson283 still walks such that de novo review is necessary for all 
"jurisdictional" and "constitutional" facts,284 in the context of de-
monstration regulation there are special reasons for insisting on com-
pletely independent judicial fact-finding, including the making of a 
fresh record. First, because of the time pressure, the administrative 
record may be incomplete; new evidence and arguments based 
thereon may come to light with each passing day. Also, disputes in 
this area are frequently so controversial and so much in the public 
eye that administrative bias is likely to be a serious problem no mat-
ter how nonpartisan the panel and how elaborate the procedural 
283. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still 
Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 163 (1949). -
284. 4 K. DAVIS, AnMINISrRATIVE LAW §§ 29.08-.09 (1958). 
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safeguards. Community pressure may result not only in a distorted 
administrative record, but also in an excessive willingness by the re-
viewing judge to defer to that record, even when the formal standard 
for review is "independent." Unwarranted judicial deference to ad-
ministrative findings is to be feared also because of the time pressure. 
A de novo standard cannot eliminate all of these temptations, but a 
judge is less likely to fall prey to those temptations if he is forced 
to listen to the evidence afresh. 
E. Self-Help 
The common law has long recognized that the most expeditious 
"procedure" of all, self-help, may sometimes also be the most 
efficacious. No matter how many deadlines are instituted and how 
many burdens are shifted, permit applicants frequently will find 
themselves empty-handed when the appointed hour for the demon-
stration arrives. What then? May they take to the streets and claim 
their asserted constitutional rights, at the risk of criminal punishment 
if their claim is ultimately rejected? Or can the legal system, having 
made every effort to process their claims in advance, demand of the 
demonstrators an abandonment or postponement of their constitu-
tional entitlements? If self-help can somehow be made a workable 
recourse in the explosive context of mass demonstrations, "judicial-
ization" can be greatly enhanced: the substantive issues can be ex-
plored after the fact, under normal time pressures, and with more 
carefully gathered evidence and the benefit of hindsight; the "highest 
possible decision-maker" can become, in practice, the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Consider the following cases. A refuses to apply for a permit; he 
undertakes a march that could have been prohibited in the first 
place; he is prosecuted for parading without a permit under a statute 
that is defective for overbreadth. B applies for a permit; he is rudely 
rebuffed by a city official in clear violation of the state permit statute 
(which is not invalid on its face); he marches anyway in a manner 
that would be protected by the first amendment; he is prosecuted 
for parading without a permit. C applies for a permit; he is rudely 
rebuffed; he notifies city officials that he will march anyway; the 
officials obtain an injunction against the march; the injunction is 
overbroad and is also based on a state statute that is overbroad; C 
marches in a manner ordinarily within his constitutional rights; he 
is prosecuted for contempt. Under the law as it now stands, A wins, 
but B and C lose! 
It has always been true that regulations which are invalid on their 
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face may be violated with impunity. Long before the civil liberties 
revolution, that doctrine had been applied for the benefit of cigarette 
vendors,285 contract carriers,286 and private detectives.287 In Lovell v. 
Griffin,228 a Jehovah's Witness convicted of distributing pamphlets 
without a permit was allowed to challenge the constitutionality of 
the ordinance under which she was prosecuted, even though she had 
never applied for a permit. Since Lovell, defendants have successfully 
raised the contention that a statute is invalid on its face after dis-
obeying permit requirements dealing with handbills,289 labor union 
solicitation,290 and film exhibition.291 Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
mingham292 recently applied the principle-rather mechanically and 
over Justice Harlan's reservations293-in the context of mass demon-
strations. In attempting to justify the doctrine, the Supreme Court 
has never gone beyond Blackstonian metaphysics: "[t]he statutes were 
as though they did not exist."294 
Quite a different principle governs when a regulatory scheme is 
valid on its face but has been unconstitutionally applied to deny 
a permit to a deserving applicant. The Supreme Court held in Pou-
los v. New Hampshire295 that such a thwarted applicant must raise 
his constitutional contention in a separate injunction or mandamus 
proceeding, before he violates the statute. The case may very well 
stand for the broad proposition that an unlawful permit refusal may 
never be tested by demonstrating without the permit. A narrower 
reading of Poulos is possible, however, because in that case there 
was an unusually long lead time-six weeks-between the refusal of 
the permit and the scheduled mass meeting-more than enough time 
to bring a mandamus or injunction action and perhaps even one ap-
peal therefrom. Thus, it is not clear whether the absolute duty to 
obey the permit denial ends once the applicant has made every effort 
to gain anticipatory relief, or whether, if he has not succeeded in 
winning judicial relief by the time of the scheduled activity, he may 
285. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900). 
286. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931). 
287. Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53 (1916). 
288. 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
289. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
290. Staub v. City of .Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958). 
291. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
292. 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
293. 394 U.S. at 159-64 Gustice Harlan, concurring). 
294. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 414 (1953). 
295. 345 U.S. 395 (1953). 
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proceed without a permit and raise his contentions later in defense 
to a criminal prosecution. 
In Walker v. City of Birmingham296 the Supreme Court was 
forced to decide whether an overly broad injunction based on an 
overly broad statute297 was governed by Lovell or Poulos. The Pou-
los principle won out, even though the lead time between the issu-
ance of the injunctions and the scheduled march in Walker was only 
two days, and even though appellate review of the injunction could 
be had within that time only in the discretion of the court. Relying on 
labor cases that dealt with temporary restraining orders designed to 
preserve the status quo pending litigation,298 the Court held that an 
injunction-even an injunction changing the position of the parties 
with no further litigation pending-must always be obeyed, with two 
possible exceptions: if it is "transparently invalid,''299 or if "peti-
tioners, before disobeying the injunction, had challenged it in the 
Alabama courts, and had been met with delay or frustration of their 
constitutional claims."300 Poulos was cited with gusto; Lovell and 
Blackstone (Does an invalid injunction "exist"? Even if it is based 
on an invalid statute?) were ignored. 
In defending the Court's present distinction between challenges 
to permit statutes invalid on their face and challenges to permit re-
fusals under concededly valid statutes, one might argue that statutes 
invalid on their face are more harmful to speech in that they "chill" 
everyone's right of expression, not just the right of a single rebuffed 
applicant, and also that such statutes are more likely to be symptom-
atic of a discriminatory pattern of enforcement, whereas a single 
improper-even discriminatory-refusal may be aberrational. On the 
other hand, it is a daring behavioral assertion to claim that adminis-
trative action arguably within the confines of an overbroad statute 
is likely to "chill" expression by laymen more than is similar action 
seemingly in violation of a narrow statute; the latter conduct would 
seem to indicate more official recalcitrance and hostility, and any 
"chilling" is likely to come from word-of-mouth or newspaper knowl-
edge that a given demonstration was rejected, rather than from an 
abstract reading of the statutes. 
If the two situations can be distinguished, the distinction should 
296. 888 U.S. 307 (1967). 
297. BIRMINGHAM, A.LA., CODE § 1159 (1944), the identical statute which was also 
at issue in Shuttlesworth. See text accompanying note 20 supra. 
298. E.g., Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922), discussed in Walker at 888 U.S. 
at 813-14; In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962), discussed in Walker at 388 U.S. at 315 n.6. 
299. 888 U.S. at 315. 
800. 888 U.S. at 818. 
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cut the other way. When the constitutional challenge is to the statute 
on its face, there is little to be gained by waiting to see the event 
unfurl; when the issue is a particular permit refusal, on the other 
hand, hindsight can be invaluable in judging the fairness of that re-
fusal. Also, since any defendant can challenge a statute on its face, the 
Lovell doctrine sometimes results in the acquittal of persons who 
could have been denied a permit even under a narrowly drawn 
statute; and these are precisely the demonstrators who are most likely 
to cause serious public disorder, rather than those who win acquittal 
only because they were by right entitled to a permit in the first place. 
Actually, these inversions should serve only to illustrate the weakness 
of the Court's present distinction. The best course would be to make 
no distinction at all. 
Injunctions are a different story. Near v. Minnesota301 to the con-
trary notwithstanding, injunctions do not have the same repressive 
features exhibited by classic prior restraints such as licensing. When 
speech is regulated by injunction, the burden of initiative is on the 
censor (as it would be under the reformed procedures advocated 
above); there is less ambiguity about who is covered; and the orig-
inal decision is made by a judge after an adversary proceeding. Con-
ceivably, too, there is less of a chilling effect, since laymen may well 
consider injunctions to be sui generis. From the law-enforcement 
side of the equation, there is something to be said for giving injunc-
tions special status: a uniform absolute duty to obey-that is, to 
abandon constitutional contentions when time does not permit final 
judicial disposition in the form of Supreme Court review or certior-
ari denial-may be too rigid and may not command respect, but a 
selective injunctive duty, if not squandered, may retain some moral 
force. 
Thus, Walker is not necessarily a bad decision: it may or may not 
be, depending on whether the two exceptions-"transparently in-
valid" and "delay or frustration"-are interpreted broadly enough 
to make the "duty to obey" a truly selective obligation, to be op-
erative only when, on balance, the dangers of self-help exceed the 
correlative "judicialization" advantages.302 The balance will vary 
somewhat in the two regulatory contexts-injunction and the stream-
lined permit process outlined above303-and the self-help rules 
should reflect that variance. As suggested above, however, no differ-
301. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
302. Such a determination need not be made, however, on an ad hoc basis but 
can be formulated in per se rules. 
303. See pts. m. B.-D. supra. 
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entiation should be made on the basis of whether the constitutional 
challenge is to the permit scheme on its face or to a specific permit 
denial under a facially valid scheme. 
First of all, there should be a general presumption, in both the 
injunction and permit application contexts, against self-help. Even 
when it is deemed to be a proper remedy-proper in the sense that 
parties who ultimately prevail on the merits are not penalized for 
having taken extra-legal action-self-help contains an element of de-
fiance. While this defiance may be carefully calculated and tempered 
in the minds of the group's leaders and lawyers, it is by no means 
certain that the spirit of moderation will filter down to the masses, 
or that police and bystanders will peaceably acknowledge the con-
textual propriety of the self-help remedy. Moreover, self-help may 
take the city by surprise, causing a panicky response or extra incon-
venience to other citizens because of inadequate policing of the event. 
These reasons for the apprehension that self-help may have unfortu-
nate consequences take on special significance when large numbers 
of demonstrators are involved. Thus, as a general principle, cities 
should be able to require that protesters challenge permit require-
ments and injunctions through the established anticipatory channels 
-permit application, declaratory judgment, mandamus, motion to 
vacate, and the like-and cities should be further allowed to treat 
the failure to exhaust those anticipatory channels as a waiver of con-
stitutional rights in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 
There are at least four situations, however, for which anticipatory 
litigation is not a satisfactory answer. First, the very right asserted 
may be freedom from any prior restraint, as when a speaker con-
tends not that he is entitled to a permit, but rather that he is en-
titled to speak without one. Second, the speaker may be unaware of 
the permit requirement or unsure about whether it extends to the 
particular activity he has planned. Third, the need for expression may 
be so immediate that it allows no time to secure a permit, as was the 
case for the truly spontaneous demonstrations following the assas-
sination of Martin Luther King and the intervention in Cambodia. 
Fourth, the demonstrators may diligently pursue all available ad-
vance remedies and still be left on the eve of the planned demon-
stration with neither vindication nor a final determination (Supreme 
Court disposition) of their rights. 
While it is true that the dangers associated with self-help are pre-
sent in these situations as well, there are also strong countervailing 
factors that must be considered. First, it would be unfair to derive 
any support from the concept of waiver when the failure to achieve 
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final adjudication in advance of the resort to self-help can in no way 
be ascribed to any procedural culpability on the part of the protes-
tors. Also, when the demonstrators' decision to engage in self-help 
is made only out of necessity, there may be no defiance mentality at 
work; the risk of violence may actually be greater should the city at-
tempt to enforce the prohibition on self-help rather than allow the 
demonstrators to proceed. Furthermore, a selective legitimation of 
self-help in response to these considerations would not amount to an 
abandonment of all checks on self-help, since normal criminal pro-
hibitions would still be operative. The city would lose only two op-
tions: (I) to punish otherwise lawful behavior because it is done 
without a permit, or in violation of the terms of an injunction; (2) 
to engage in multiple charging-perhaps gaining plea-bargaining 
leverage804-by adding a count of parading without a permit or con-
tempt to other counts of disorderly conduct, obstructing public pas-
sageways, unlawful assembly, trespass, and the like. At the very least, 
these additional factors suggest that the general rule against self-help 
should not be mechanically applied in the four enumerated fact 
situations. Rather, in those instances, the self-help issue must be re-
solved by a more detailed analysis. 
I. Speech That Cannot Be Subjected to a Prior Restraint 
The first situation is that of the speaker who claims that his ac-
tivity cannot be subjected to any kind of prior restraint-perhaps a 
nonamplified speech in a large park would fall into this category.305 
In the context of a prosecution for speaking without a permit, this 
constitutional contention should be heard even if the defendant 
never bothered to apply for a permit or to challenge the permit re-
quirement in advance, for if he is successful, the defendant will have 
shown that he had a constitutional right to do exactly what he did: 
speak without a permit. On the other hand, if the court concludes 
that the particular activity may properly be subjected to a permit 
requirement, but that in the immediate instance the speaker would 
have been entitled to a permit had he applied, the speaker's failure 
to utilize advance channels would be fatal to his defense. 
The problem is more difficult in the injunction context. It is by 
no means clear that there is any activity that can claim absolute 
immunity from injunctive regulation-even the nonamplified 
speech in the park might be constitutionally enjoined during an on-
304. See generally Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 50 (1968). 
305. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 823 U.S. 516 (1945). 
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going riot or upon proof that the speaker specifically intends to en-
gage in violence. Most analogous to the situation in which a speaker 
claims immunity from any prior restraint is when an injunction is 
issued for obviously unconstitutional reasons306 and when an injunc-
tion is issued to enforce a permit requirement against an activity that 
cannot constitutionally be subjected to such a requirement. For those 
two kinds of injunctions, it may already be the law-in light of 
Walker v. City of Birmingham301 and a 1945 case, Thomas v. Col-
lins308-that a resort to self-help in the face of an injunction without 
any attempt to seek advance relief does not preclude raising first 
amendment contentions in subsequent contempt proceedings. 
In Walker, it will be remembered, the Court qualified its pro-
scription of self-help with the following observation: "Without ques-
tion the state court that issued the injunction had, as a court of 
equity, jurisdiction over the petitioners and over the subject matter 
of the controversy. And this is not a case where the injunction was 
transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity."309 
It is still unclear whether this language represents merely a make-
weight argument or a careful delineation of doctrine. In this regard, 
it is perhaps noteworthy that subsequent cases have indicated that 
the Walker injunction was in fact unconstitutional in at least two 
respects-it was based on a statute invalid on its face810 and it was 
issued ex parte311-and yet those very cases have cited Walker with-
out the slightest suggestion that it was decided wrongly on its facts. 
In Thomas the defendant was served with a temporary restrain-
ing order just six hours before he was due to mount the hustings for 
a scheduled speech. He flouted the order, was cited for contempt, and 
won reversal from the Supreme Court upon successfully contending 
that his speech could not, under the first amendment, be subjected 
to the slightest prior restraint-not even a pro forma registration 
requirement. The majority in Poulos distinguished Thomas by mis-
takenly claiming that the entire registration scheme had been de-
clared unconstitutional on its face312 but the Thomas court explicitly 
806. Under the substantive standards advocated in this Article (see pts. II. B.-E. 
supra), an obviously unconstitutional injunction would be based either on the con-
tent of the proposed speech, the fear of a hostile audience, or the past conduct of the 
speaker. 
307. 388 U.S. l!07 (1967). 
308. l!2l! U.S. 516 (1945). 
l!09. l!88 U.S. at l!I5. 
l!IO. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150•51, 15l! (1969). 
l!ll. Carroll v. President & Commrs., l!93 U.S. 175, 180 (1968). 
l!l2. l!45 U.S. at 413•14. It should be noted that this placed the case within the 
confines of the Lovell doctrine. 
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disavowed such a holding at two different places in the opinion.313 
Thus, either Thomas has been obliquely overruled by Poulos, or 
Thomas stands for one, or both, of two propositions: (1) injunctions 
enforcing permit or registration requirements against activities that 
are constitutionally immune from such prior restraints may be chal-
lenged by means of self-help without the necessity of resorting to any 
available advance remedies; (2) whenever time does not allow for an 
adequate advance remedy, self-help is a proper means of challenging 
an injunction on first amendment grounds. This latter proposition is 
relevant to the fourth enumerated fact situation (the failure to 
achieve final disposition by the time set for the event) discussed 
below314-but the former proposition, if it is in fact the correct read-
ing of Thomas, would clearly make that case important authority 
for the first fact situation, now under consideration. 
Given, then, this unseemly tangle of cryptic precedents, what 
should the law be? A number of arguments can be made for the con-
tention that the duty to challenge an injunction in advance of the 
planned event should be absolute-at least when time permits such 
an advance challenge-and that any exceptions to this duty that 
might be extrapolated from the Walker and Thomas opinions ought 
to be nipped in the bud. It is always desirable that legal obligations 
be unambiguous and unequivocal, but these features are especially 
important when political passions run high, and when the legal ob-
ligation in question lacks such other legitimating supports as con-
ception in the abstract, legislative approval, and general applicability. 
Once more, self-help raises the risk of violence--city officials are 
likely to be blind to the transparent invalidity of the injunction and 
can be expected to enforce it; an appellate court in vacating the in-
junction can avert the risk of violence and can sometimes achieve 
last-minute cooperation between demonstrators and city officials. It 
might also be hypothesized that the quantitative advantages of any ex-
ceptions for "transparency," "frivolity," or whatever, are likely to be 
too insignificant to justify sacrificing the clarity and moral force of an 
absolute duty: no doubt many judges issue unconstitutional injunc-
tions, but how often are transparently invalid injunctions granted? 
Moreover, from the standpoint of judicial economy, there is much to 
be said for avoiding the necessity for two-dimensional constitutional 
line-drawing: What is invalid? What is transparently invalid? Finally, 
in situations like that presented in Thomas, it makes sense to give 
the city an incentive to enforce its permit system by obtaining an in-
313. 323 U.S. at 532-33, 541-42. 
314. See text accompanying notes 331-49 infra. 
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junction in advance rather than by simply lying in wait for the dem-
onstrators and arresting them for speaking or marching without a 
permit. In this regard, an anticipatory injunction puts the demon-
strators on notice that their proposed event is, at least in the minds of 
the city and the issuing judge, subject to the permit requirement. 
Also, the city's injunction request may be denied on the ground that 
the event cannot be subjected to the permit requirement, and it is 
better for all concerned that such a judicial determination come be-
fore the event, rather than after the demonstration has been aborted, 
the demonstrators arrested, and the community subjected to whatever 
violence and disruption may ensue in the process. 
Against these several considerations, it is difficult to imagine any 
countervailing arguments that would justify an exception to the ab-
solute duty to make an advance challenge to all injunctions, no mat-
ter how obviously invalid, so long as time permits. Perhaps the ghost 
of Blackstone, however, would explain that a transparently invalid 
injunction does not exist, whereas a merely invalid injunction, being 
nontransparent, must be real. 
2. Ignorance of the Prior Restraint 
The second situation-in which the protestors are unaware of the 
prior restraint or unsure of its scope-arises primarily in the context 
of prosecutions for speaking without a permit, since most jurisdic-
tions make actual notice of an injunction a prerequisite to a convic-
tion for contempt. While no court appears to have addressed itself 
directly to the question whether the first amendment requires a 
general alteration in the normal criminal or equitable rules regard-
ing notice, the Supreme Court has grappled with a number of related 
problems. 
In Lambert v. California,315 a Los Angeles ordinance making it 
unlawful for a convicted felon to remain in the city for more than 
five days without registering was held to be violative of due process 
"where it is applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his 
duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of 
such knowledge."316 The Court was careful, however, to stress the 
unique features of the ordinance in question and thus squelched any 
implication that ignorance of the law will always be a constitutional 
defense in prosecution for failure to comply with a registration or 
permit statute: "Violation of its provisions is unaccompanied by any 
315. 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
316. 355 U.S. at 227. 
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activity whatever, mere presence in the city being the test. Moreover, 
circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity 
of registration are completely lacking."317 While Lambert thus can-
not be read as an across-the-board limitation on strict liability and 
constructive notice, it can be argued that the rather demanding stan-
dard of notice applied in the case may also be a proper one when 
first amendment interests are at stake. Such a contention would find 
support in Smith v. California,318 in which the Court held that some 
element of scienter is constitutionally required to convict booksellers 
for possession of obscene literature. Although Smith dealt with igno-
rance of facts rather than of law,319 and although the holding was 
based on the phenomenon of self-censorship320-a phenomenon 
which may function differently when the strict liability relates to 
ignorance of the law-the case is nonetheless important for the gen-
eral proposition that a more demanding mens rea requirement may 
be one element of the burgeoning concept of "first amendment due 
process." 
While Lambert and Smith can only be regarded as faint probes, 
at least on the notice issue with respect to prior restraints on demon-
trations, one of the Court's holdings in Cox v. Louisiana321 has a 
more definite thrust. The defendant in Cox was convicted under a 
statute that prohibited picketing "near" a courthouse.322 It was uncon-
tested that he had picketed approximately 125 feet from the court-
house, but the Court held that the defendant's "mistake of law" was 
exculpatory as a matter of due process (with no special reliance on the 
first amendment) because he had been misled by city officials on the 
scene who had, at least in the Court's reading of the record,323 given 
him permission to picket where he did. Thus, a violation committed 
on the basis of a mistake of law induced by city officials was held to 
amount to no violation at all. 
This background of case precedent offers a good starting point 
for a more comprehensive approach to the problem of mistake of law 
as it relates to self-help. First, on the special problem of a mistake of 
law induced by city officials, the Cox holding is clearly correct, at 
least if one accepts the Court's reading of the record. There are a 
317. 855 U.S. at 229. 
818. 861 U.S. 147 (1959). 
819. 861 U.S. at 149. 
820. 361 U.S. at 154. 
821. 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
322. LA. REv. STAT. § 14:401 (Supp. 1962), quoted at 879 U.S. at 560. 
328. 379 U.S. at 569. 
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number of general reasons for a separate rule when government offi-
cials have induced the mistake on the part of the demonstrators: the 
absence of blameworthiness on the part of the demonstrators; the 
desirability of giving city officials an incentive to know what they 
are talking about; the de minimis danger-serious in other mistake-
of-law cases-that demonstrators may intentionally preserve their 
ignorance of the law if it works to their legal advantage. Moreover, a 
separate approach to these cases is particularly essential in the context 
of prior restraints on demonstrations for two reasons: (1) in an at-
mosphere of charged emotions, a broken promise or change of posi-
tion by the city is likely to be especially dangerous and should, 
accordingly, be discouraged by a strong "estoppel" doctrine; and 
(2) protestors should be given every incentive to consult city hall in 
advance-including the hope of winning binding concessions-and 
should be freed from every disincentive-including the possibility 
of being "entrapped" by a mistaken interpretation of the law. Indeed, 
the best course of action for the Court to take would be to enshrine 
in due process, or at least in "first amendment due process," the 
following provision from the Model Penal Code, which was cited 
with approval in the Cox opinion: 
(3) A reasonable belief that conduct does not legally constitute an 
offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon 
such conduct, when: 
(b) [the defendant] acts in reasonable reliance upon an official 
statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or 
erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a 
judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii) an administrative 
order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation 
of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibil-
ity for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of 
the law defining the offense.a24 
With regard to mistakes of law that cannot be blamed on govern-
ment officials, three basic approaches to the problem can be imagined: 
(1) a requirement that actual knowledge of the law should be a pre-
requisite to conviction; (2) a negligence standard whereby failure to 
apply for a permit, or violation of the terms of an injunction, would 
be punishable only upon proof of either actual knowledge of the 
law or a negligent failure to be aware of or inquire about the law; 
(3) a firm application of the principle that ignorance of the law should 
be no defense. 
ll24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(ll)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), cited at ll79 U.S. 
at569 n.l!. 
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With respect to direct criminal prosecutions for activities without 
the required permit, an application of the negligence standard would 
appear to be the best approach; indeed, it should be constitutionally 
required in such situations. A requirement of actual knowledge 
would be undesirable in that it would reward ignorance in an area 
in which familiarity with the law and advance efforts to communicate 
with city officials ought to be strongly encouraged. Also, an actual-
knowledge standard would tend to complicate litigation-always a 
factor to be considered, although admittedly the consideration is not 
so crucial here as in the context of expedited litigation.325 
On the other hand, prosecution of demonstrators whose ignorance 
of the law cannot be deemed at least negligent would seem to be 
unnecessarily harsh in light of the other adequate regulatory safe-
guards available to the city-particularly the standard criminal pro-
hibitions.326 Furthermore, there is a great potential for disruption and 
radicalization when the police attempt on-the-spot enforcement of a 
regulation against demonstrators who reasonably believe that they 
have not been given a fair opportunity to comply with the regulation. 
Thus, the first amendment should be read to require that at least 
reasonable-that is, nonnegligent-ignorance of the permit require-
ment be exculpatory. 
The same constitutional principle should also apply to injunc-
tions. The first amendment should not independently shield a 
demonstrator who negligently remains unaware of an injunction that 
binds him,321 although most jurisdictions insist on actual notice as 
a matter of the law of equity.328 A constitutional standard of negli-
325. See text accompanying notes 252-64 supra. 
326. The self-help privilege, as developed herein, would shield demonstrators only 
from convictions for violating prior restraints. A comprehensive analysis of subsequent 
punishments for demonstrations might conclude that offenses such as breach of the 
peace, unlawful assembly, or obstructing public passageways, should be subjected to 
special constitutional limitations when demonstrators have sought to cooperate in 
advance with city officials or when spontaneity is justified. That, however, is a question 
of some magnitude and beyond the scope of this discussion. It is sufficient, for present 
purposes, to note that most self-help protest activities are not, apart from the prior-
restraint aspect, unlawful. The one important exception to this generalization is when 
demonstrators cordon off a street, an action which would no doubt support a 
conviction for obstructing public passageways. That particular form of self-help, 
however, is so likely to cause serious disruption, and to lead to retaliatory "self-help" 
by drivers and pedestrians, that it ought to be absolutely prohibited. 
327. Typically, this situation would arise only in the case of injunctions of the 
broad, class-action variety, although it is not an absolute requirement that a person 
have been a party to an injunction proceeding in order to be bound by the decree. 
See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 994, 1028-31 (1965). 
328. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 33 F.2d 489, 490-91 (8th Cir. 1929); Garrigan 
v. United States, 163 F. 16 (7th Cir 1908); The Cape May &: Schellinger's Landing R.R. 
Co. v. Johnson, 35 N.J. Eq. 422 (Ch. 1882). See generally Note, Contempt Proceedings 
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gence would probably have more impact when the mistake of law 
goes not to the existence of the injunction but to its interpretation. 
In that situation, there is a need to protect demonstrators against 
ambiguously or broadly phrased injunctions, especially in view of 
the temptations to employ such injunctions: drafting a narrow in-
junction can be a time-consuming process; when particularly noto-
rious groups are the subject of the injunction, the city may under-
standably attempt to secure an open-ended regulatory weapon. 
Thus, in both the injunction and direct-prosecution situations, 
"first amendment due process" should require that nonnegligent 
mistakes of law not induced by government officials be exculpatory, 
but apart from that states and municipalities should remain free to 
shape their mm notice doctrines. 
3. The Spontaneous Demonstration 
The third situation in which an insistence on the use of advance 
channels rather than self-help may be unfair is that of the sponta-
neous demonstration. Earlier it was suggested that any exception to 
the demonstrators' obligation to give city officials the required advance 
notice-up to forty-eight hours-ought to be confined to exceptional 
cases in which unforeseen events of obvious importance make imme-
diate protest efficacious.329 Thus, by hypothesis, if the day after the 
intervention in Cambodia a student group wished to march in protest, 
a city should not be able to reject a permit request simply because 
there would not be forty-eight hours lead time. But should the 
students be permitted to march the day after the announcement of 
the invasion without attempting in the interim to secure a permit? 
Moreover, should the group be permitted to commandeer the streets 
immediately after the President's patriotic peroration? 
As to the former question, the rule ought to be one that requires 
strict exhaustion of all available advance channels of relief-formal 
and informal. Even if the time factor would not allow for adequate 
deliberation on the permit request in terms of the substantive 
standards discussed above,330 the bare notification that a demonstra-
tion is planned can be of great assistance to a city in formulating an 
orderly response to the event. Municipalities should thus be able to 
prosecute "spontaneous" demonstrators for failure to possess a permit 
Against Persons Not Named in an Injunction, 46 HARv. L. REv. !!HI (1933); Note, 
Criminal Contempt: Violations of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 32 IND. L.J. 514, 
524-28 (1957). 
329. See text following note 175 supra. 
!130. See pt. II. supra. 
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if there was any meaningful time period-two hours or more-
during which the group could have attempted to get official permis-
sion to demonstrate, but failed to do so. 
The literally spontaneous outpouring presents a far more difficult 
dilemma than the semi-spontaneous phenomenon just discussed. 
Emotions are likely to be at a summit of intensity such that any 
interference with the demonstrators by the police will ordinarily 
create an enormous risk of violence, yet, at the same time, the dis-
ruption potential in terms of competing public uses, uncontrollable 
lawlessness, and hostile backlash will usually also be at a ma.ximum 
because of the element of surprise. Furthermore, it is probable that 
the choice of a legal doctrine is unlikely to influence behavior in 
these circumstances: no matter what first amendment principle is 
deemed controlling, the protestors will still take to the streets in these 
moments of passion, and the police will still make arrests when they 
believe that the demonstration is getting out of hand. If this percep-
tion is correct, the spontaneity issue-unlike almost all the other 
issues growing out of prior restraints on demonstrations-should be 
decided on the basis of fairness alone, with no attempt to erect deter-
rents and incentives. Surely there is little to be said for punishing 
the demonstrators for their failure to secure a permit, for if their be-
havior is truly spontaneous, such a failure certainly cannot be charac-
terized as blameworthy. Admittedly, however, spontaneity is ex-
tremely difficult to establish or refute by way of convincing proof. 
This difficulty of proof could lead to the abuse of any self-help 
privilege for spontaneity; that is why the objective standard for 
spontaneity-"in response to unforeseen events of obvious impor-
tance"-is preferable to any subjective test. 
4. Inability on the Part of the Demonstrators To 
Secure Relief Through Advance Channels 
The fourth, and probably most important, situation in which 
self-help may be the only efficacious procedure for would-be demon-
strators is that in which the protestors have made every reasonable 
effort to seek relief through advance channels and have not received 
by the time scheduled for the demonstration either the relief sought 
or a final determination-in the form of a Supreme Court ruling or 
denial of certiorari-of their legal claims. Since few, if any, demon-
strations are planned far enough in advance to allow the case to wend 
its way up to the Supreme Court, the real issue here is whether the 
general disapproval of self-help is to be embodied as an unqualified 
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duty of obedience, subject to the few exceptions discussed above,331 
or merely as a requirement that the preferable advance remedies be 
exhausted before resorting to self-help. If one accepts the argument 
that the identity of the ultimate decision-maker is every bit as impor-
tant as the applicable substantive doctrine,332 it is apparent that this 
particular issue is of crucial significance. 
A strong argument can be made that the Supreme Court has al-
ready opted for a rule of exhaustion rather than one of absolute 
obedience. As previously discussed,333 this may be the explanation 
for the result in Thomas v. Collins.334 Also, the Walker holding was 
sharply qualified: 
This case would arise in quite a different constitutional posture 
if the petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had challenged 
it in the Alabama courts, and had been met with delay or frustration 
of their constitutional claims. But there is no showing that such 
would have been the fate of a timely motion to modify or dissolve 
the injunction. There was an interim of two days between the is-
suance of the injunction and the Good Friday march. The petitioners 
give absolutely no explanation of why they did not make some ap-
plication to the state court during that period.335 
Moreover, the Walker majority distinguished an earlier case, In re 
Green,336 on the ground that "[t]he petitioner in Green, unlike the 
petitioners here, had attempted to challenge the validity of the in-
junction before violating it by promptly applying to the issuing court 
for an order vacating the injunction."337 It may also be significant 
that in neither Howat v. Kansas338 nor United States v. United Mine 
Workers of America,339 the primary doctrinal precedents for the 
Walker holding, had the contempt defendants exhausted their ad-
vance channels of relief. Finally, toward the end of the Walker 
opinion, the Court stated that "[the defendants] could not bypass 
orderly judicial review of the injunction before disobeying it,"340 
331. See text accompanying notes 305-30 supra. 
332. See pts. III. C.-D. supra. 
333. See text accompanying note 314 supra. 
334. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). Thomas made no attempt to vacate the injunction which 
was served on him in Houston six hours before his scheduled speech, but that could 
only have been done in Austin, 170 miles away-a round-trip of more than six hours 
in 1945. 
335. 388 U.S. at 318-19. 
336. 369 U.S. 689 (1962). 
337. 388 U.S. at 315 n.6. 
!!38. 258 U.S. 181 (1922). 
339. 330 U.S. 258 {1947). 
340. 388 U.S. at 320. 
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thus implying that an exhaustion of advance channels might justify 
disobedience. On the other hand, it should be noted that the Court's 
use in Walker of the phrase "delay or frustration of their constitu-
tional claims"341 could be interpreted as a studied omission of the 
word "rejection," and also that the Howat statement of the doctrine, 
cited with approval in Walker, tends to support an absolute-obedi-
ence interpretation: "until the decision of the [issuing court] is 
reversed for error by orderly review, either by the [issuing court] 
or a higher court, [its orders] based on its decision are to be respected 
and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be 
punished. "342 
This ambiguity concerning the true meaning of Walker ought to 
be resolved in favor of the exhaustion interpretation. As always, an 
overriding goal should be to encourage demonstrators to establish 
lines of communication with city officials. 343 A legitimation of self-
hel p, holding out the promise of eventual acquittal on contempt or 
criminal charges, but conditioned on an exhaustion of advance 
channels, would seem to provide demonstrators with a powerful 
incentive to use those channels, even when they are skeptical about 
the possibility of obtaining direct relief. Any uneasiness about 
legitimating defiant behavior should be partially allayed by the fact 
that the normal criminal prohibitions would still be operative.344 
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the employment of 
self-help by demonstrators cannot be undertaken with reckless aban-
don; the tactic must remain a calculated gamble since the demonstra-
tors will be acquitted of contempt or other criminal charges only if 
they prevail on the merits. It might even be suggested that the above 
factors, when added to the requirement of strict exhaustion, will 
result in a filtering process that will make virtually irrelevant the 
broad fears about a defiance mentality that underlie much of the 
general disdain for self-help. 
In support of the absolute-obedience interpretation, on the other 
hand, one might point to the virtues of a clear, unequivocal legal 
duty. Such an argument is seriously undercut, however, by the pre-
vailing doctrines which provide that an injunction may be defied 
when it has been issued by a court without jurisdiction,345 and that 
a statute may be flouted when it is unconstitutional on its face.346 
341. 388 U.S. at 318. 
342. 258 U.S. at 189-90, cited at 388 U.S. at 314. 
343. See text following note 281 supra. 
344. See note 326 supra and accompanying text. 
345. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967). 
346. See text accompanying notes 285-94 supra. 
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Furthermore, it is not even clear that one who attaches virtually ex-
clusive significance to avoiding street confrontations should favor the 
absolute-obedience interpretation: "hard-core" dissenters will take to 
the streets no matter what the self-help doctrines are, but they may 
be more interested in keeping their demonstration orderly if they 
have hopes of prevailing on the merits. Moreover, if self-help is 
absolutely taboo, respectable dissenters are likely to stay away, leaving 
the battleground entirely to the more defiant demonstrators, whereas 
a conditional legitimation of the tactic may encourage those protestors 
capable of exercising a moderating influence to be present. 
It might be suggested that the exhaustion interpretation ought to 
prevail only in those situations in which the exact proposed date of 
the demonstration has some special significance for reasons of sym-
bolism, nationwide coordination, or whatever. The two best law 
review commentaries on the general problem of the duty to obey 
allegedly unlawful injunctions347 both favor the exhaustion approach 
but would limit it to those instances in which "obedience would have 
subjected [the protestors] to significant and irreparable harm."348 As 
with the consideration of reasonable alternatives in deciding the 
merits of a permit application,349 however, it would be anomalous 
to allow judges to second-guess the protestors' own judgment con-
cerning timing strategy, especially since it would seem that in cases 
in which demonstrators do not feel strongly about the target date, 
they would prefer to accept a delay in order to pursue further ad-
vance remedies, rather than to employ self-help at the risk of a con-
tempt conviction if they were unsuccessful on the merits. Further-
more, attorneys charged with advising groups about their self-help 
rights might justifiably chafe at the prospect of having to calculate 
not only the odds of success on the merits, but also the odds of per-
suading the court of the special significance of the particular date. 
Thus, the simpler rule of a universal self-help privilege conditioned 
on a thorough exhaustion of all advance channels is much to be pre-
ferred. ·. , !f~!J 
To recapitulate, protestors faced with prior restraints should be 
required to exhaust all advance channels of relief before taking to 
the streets. This strict exhaustion requirement should govern regard-
less of whether the prior restraint is an injunction or a permit 
347. Cox, The Void Order and the Duty To Obey, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 86 (1948); 
Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARV. L. REv. 626 (1970). 
348. Note, supra note 347, at 642. 
349. See text accompanying notes 61-69 supra. 
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requirement, regardless -of whether the protestors' constitutional 
challenge is to the regulatory scheme "on its face" or "as applied," 
and regardless of how "transparently" unconstitutional the prior 
restraint may be. Self-help should be permissible only in a few special-
ized instances: (I) when the particular protest activity cannot con-
stitutionally be subjected to any kind of a permit requirement and 
the government has not obtained an injunction either to restrain 
the activity directly or to enforce the permit requirement; (2) when 
the demonstrators are nonnegligently unaware of the existence or 
scope of the prior restraint, or act in reasonable reliance on an inter-
pretation of the law given by a local official; (3) when unforeseen 
events of obvious importance make immediate protest efficacious; 
(4) when demonstrators have exhausted all available advance chan-
nels in the state court system and have not received by the scheduled 
date of the event either vindication or final determination of their 
constitutional claims. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Prior restraints on demonstrations should be subjected to more 
vigorous constitutional scrutiny, both with regard to substantive 
standards and procedures. In the substantive realm, competing public 
uses should not be measured, as at present, by such open-ended terms 
as "reasonable," "undue," and "convenience," but rather should be 
quantified, albeit somewhat arbitrarily: it should be unconstitutional 
to prohibit a proposed demonstration unless the number of persons 
seriously inconvenienced (in terms of driving and pedestrian delays, 
and losses of access, parking, and quietude) exceeds the number of 
persons who would participate in the event, or unless the number of 
those inconvenienced in a minor way is grossly disproportionate to 
the number of participants. So long as this numerical balancing 
formula is enforced, municipalities should not be required to give 
different groups equal treatment with respect to the use of public 
'iand for mass demonstrations; it ought to be permissible to favor 
popular groups with a "speech surplus." On the other hand, a 
demonstration should never be prohibited because there are "reason-
able alternatives" in terms of time and site available to the protestors. 
Per se prohibitions relating to time, place, size, and duration should 
be upheld only if, for the overwhelming majority of cases that fall 
within their ken, the municipal balancing formula would likewise 
justify prohibition. 
Never should a demonstration be prohibited on the basis of the 
content of proposed speeches and placards, the fear of a hostile 
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audience, or the past conduct of the demonstrators. If it can be 
proved, however, that the demonstrators have a specific intent to 
engage in or provoke violence, that should be a sufficient ground for 
denying a permit or issuing an injunction. Also, injunctions against 
specific speeches and placards should be permissible if the content 
would be punishable, consistent with the first amendment, in subse-
quent criminal and civil proceedings, but such an injunction should 
never be a basis for prohibiting the entire gathering. 
Municipalities should be able to prohibit gatherings on the 
ground that the demonstrators did not give notice or apply for a 
permit far enough in advance, but no advance-filing requirement of 
longer than forty-eight hours ought to be upheld, and cities should 
be required to allow spontaneous demonstrations when they are in 
response to unforeseen events of obvious importance. All advance-
payment requirements (insurance, peace bonds, payment for police 
services) should be held to be violative of the first amendment, but 
a city should be able to require that the protest organizers make a 
good faith effort to raise funds at the event in order to defray the 
policing and clean-up costs. 
In addition to these constitutional restrictions on the reasons that 
may justify prior restraints, the Supreme Court should subject 
demonstration regulation to the same procedural requirements now 
in force in the film censorship area. The city should always bear the 
burden of proof, except on the issue of how many participants are 
expected to take part in the demonstration. Permit schemes should 
be required to include a deadline for administrative action-such a 
deadline should be no longer than one week after the filing of the 
permit application, with a special provision that applications filed 
within a week of the proposed demonstrations be ruled upon by city 
officials at least nventy-four hours before the scheduled time for the 
event. The burden of initiating judicial proceedings should be on 
the city government, and local trial courts should be required to 
render a final decision within one week after the city's decision to go 
to court rather than grant the permit. 
There should be no constitutional requirement of an administra-
tive hearing; and when formal hearings are initiated at the adminis-
trative stage, judicial review should be of the de novo variety. Fur-
thermore, appellate courts should make independent determinations 
of fact on the basis of the trial court record. 
Demonstrators should be held to a strict duty to exhaust all 
advance remedies, subject to exceptions for activities that are totally 
immune by virtue of the first amendment from any sort of permit 
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requirement, for reasonable mistakes of law, and for spontaneous 
demonstrations. Once protestors have exhausted all advance channels, 
however, they should be allowed to claim their asserted rights by 
self-help. 
These conclusions depend, to an inordinate extent, on predictions 
of behavior-predictions unsubstantiated by survey data or "inter-
disciplinary" documentation. As is true in almost every modern prob-
lem area, the issues that arise out of mass demonstrations must, of 
necessity, be resolved without the benefit of empirical knowledge. 
Until that situation is corrected, the choice is between careful guess-
work and analytic paralysis. Readers who object-on general prin-
ciple or on the basis of a particular philosophy of judicial review-to 
departure from the status quo in the absence of "hard" data may 
wish to treat this entire discussion as presenting an agenda for 
quantitative research rather than, as is intended, a program for imme-
diate doctrinal reform. It may be, however, that today the process 
of constitutional innovation is itself working against a deadline. 
